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Walsh: Victims of a Growing Crisis: A Call for Reform of the United Stat

VICTIMS OF A GROWING CRISIS: A CALL FOR REFORM OF THE
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY PERTAINING
TO REFUGEES OF THE IRAQ WAR
"To states, they can be security risks. To ordinary people, they can be
objects of pity and charity. But refugees matter most... because at
some level we all realize that but for the accidents of birth and circumstance, we could be refugees ourselves."
1
Arthur Helton

I.

THE PLIGHT OF IRAQI REFUGEES

When the United States troops crossed the border into Iraq in the
Spring of 2003, Raza Maliki signed up as one of the first of thousands of
Iraqis who aided the United States military. 2 He worked all day as a translator for his military division, risking his own life to help the United States
troops navigate the increasingly hostile Iraqi streets. 3 Raza has paid dearly
for his service since then. 4 Militants made death threats to him and his
family for working with "the occupiers." 5 Militants also threatened his father, who worked as a contractor for the United States. 6 As a result, Raza
fled Baghdad for Syria but was turned away, only to be denied reentry to
Iraq by Iraqi border guards. 7 With nowhere to turn, he remained
stranded on the border, forced to languish in a packed and squalid refu1. Arthur Helton, World Refugees: Arthur Helton, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/community/chat/2002-06-20-helton.htm (speaking on
relevance of helping refugees throughout world). Arthur Helton was the former
Director of Peace and Conflict Studies for the Council on Foreign Relations. See
id. (describing Helton's credentials). He was killed in 2003 when a terrorist bomb
destroyed the United Nations Headquarters in Iraq where he was meeting with
United Nations Special Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello. See Gil Loescher, Going Forward from the TerroristAttacks on the UN, 17J. REFUGEE STUD. 257, 257 (2004) (discussing causalities of terrorist attack).
2. See Audio Tape: Interview with Raza Maliki (Aug. 11, 2007) (on file with
author) (explaining how Raza began work as interpreter for United States military). The author conducted this interview while on a fact-finding trip to Damascus, Syria and Amman, Jordan during August of 2007. The author changed this
individual's name for the purpose of protecting his identity.
3. See id. (describing work Raza performed while working for United States
military).
4. See id. (indicating violence that would soon befall Raza and his family).
5. See id. (stating threats issued by gunmen against Raza's family for their association with United States military).
6. See id. (describing threats issued by gunmen against Raza's father in
particular).
7. See id. (recounting problems that Raza faced as refugee attempting to gain
entrance into different countries in region).
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gee camp in "no man's land" where hundreds like him shared the same
8
fate.
After Raza fled, militants continued to target his family for their presumed support of United States troops. 9 This past July, masked gunmen
kidnapped Raza's father, tortured him with acid and left him for dead. 10
In an effort to save his life, doctors amputated both of his father's legs that
the acid had burned irreparably, but infection killed him days later." Despite all their service to the American military, Raza and his family have
been largely abandoned by the American government's current laws that
12
are designed, at least in principle, to protect Iraqi refugees.
This Note proposes a modest reform to the current resettlement and
visa policy that the United States government has adopted towards Iraqi
refugees, specifically those being targeted for their past service to the
United States or because of their minority status.' 3 The proposed reform
has three basic objectives. 14 The first objective is to amend the material
support provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act, which at present, prevents thousands of refugees from resettlement for actions performed under duress.' 5 The second objective is to prioritize resettlement
for Iraqis who formally assisted the United States military or who are members of targeted minorities, preferably in the form of a modified special

8. See id. (discussing Raza's time spent trapped along Iraqi-Syrian border in
crowded refugee camp).
9. See id. (describing how gunmen violently targeted Raza and his family for
their work with United States military).
10. See id. (recounting kidnapping and torture of Raza's father in Baghdad).
The gunmen were members of a secular militia operating in Iraq known as the
Mehdi Army. See id. (recounting details of kidnapping).
11. See id. (describing eventual death of Raza's father from infection contracted after he suffered extensive torture).
12. See id. (explaining great difficulties that Raza and his family have encountered in receiving refugee resettlement from United States).
13. For a discussion of the proposed reforms to United States immigration
law and policy, see infra notes 118-88 and accompanying text. The author does not
suggest that those Iraqis who served the military operations of other countries allied with the United States, such as the United Kingdom, do not deserve refugee
protection as well. The question of whether these refugees should receive refugee
resettlement in the United States instead of the United Kingdom is beyond the
scope of this Note.
14. For a discussion of the proposed reforms to United States immigration
law and policy as it pertains to Iraqi refugees, see infra notes 118-88 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion on reforming the material bar support in the Immigration and Nationality Act, see infra notes 124-44 and accompanying text.
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visa. 16 The final objective is to increase the number of Iraqi refugees al1 7
lowed into the United States and expedite their resettlement.
Part II elaborates on the plight of Iraqi refugees by describing the
humanitarian crisis they face and explaining why these particular groups
are targeted. 18 Part III discusses the legal protection that currently is available for Iraqi refugees. 19 Part IV critiques these existing legal protections
by demonstrating the gaps in refugee law and policy that have abandoned
thousands of the most vulnerable Iraqis. 20 Part V proposes three basic
changes to the existing immigration law and policy that will allow for a
more effective resettlement of Iraqi refugees, and additionally, addresses
the security concerns that such proposals inevitably raise. 21 Finally, Part
VI provides a brief conclusion affirming the need for immigration reform
and the practicability of the proposed measures for expeditiously processing the most vulnerable Iraqis for resettlement without undermining se22
curity concerns.
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE IRAQI REFUGEE

CRISIS

The severity of the Iraqi refuge crisis is shown through the sheer number of Iraqi refugees that exist, and also, by the squalid living conditions in
which they manage to survive. 23 An estimated 2.2 million native Iraqis
have fled Iraq, and are largely living in impoverished refugee ghettos
16. For a discussion of the proposed special status visa for Iraqi refugees who
are targeted due to their past service or vulnerable minority status, see infra notes
145-59 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of proposed changes to increase and expedite the resettlement of Iraqi refugees in the United States, see infra notes 160-74 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the humanitarian plight of Iraqi refugees, see infra
notes 23-47 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the legal protections currently available to Iraqi refugees, see infra notes 48-71 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the shortcomings of the current United States immigration law and policy as it pertains to Iraqi refugees, see infra notes 72-117 and
accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the proposed reforms to the United States immigration law and policy, as well as related security concerns, see infra notes 118-88 and
accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of this Note's conclusion, see infra notes 189-98 and accompanying text.
23. SeeS. 1651, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (stating findings of proposed Refugee
Crisis in Iraq Act, introduced in Senate by Sen. Edward Kennedy). "[The] United
Nations estimates that there are 2,000,000 Iraqis internally displaced and more
than 2,000,000 Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries." Id. (detailing number of
Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons). Additionally, the "humanitarian
needs of the Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons are significant." Id.
(recognizing growing needs of refugees). Rep. Alcee Hastings introduced a bill
with similar findings in the House of Representatives. See H.R. 3674, 11 0th Cong.
§ 2 (2007) ("The Iraq Study group predicted that '[a] humanitarian catastrophe
could follow as more refugees are forced to relocate across the country and the
region.'").
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throughout Syria and Jordan. 24 Approximately 2 million additional Iraqis
fled their homes but remain displaced within Iraq. 25 Intense sectarian violence throughout the country continues to create more refugees. 26 The
United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq and the World Food Program
estimate that around half of all displaced Iraqis have no access to official
food distribution channels. 27 Medical treatment for the sick and elderly,
which is practically non-existent in many parts of Iraq, is very difficult to
28
receive in neighboring countries harboring refugees.

24. See Patrick Cockburn, UN Warns of Five Million Iraqi Refugees, INDEPENDENT
(London),June 10, 2007, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middleeast/article2640418.ece (reporting on growing numbers of refugees arising from widespread violence in Iraq). Neighboring countries have also absorbed massive
number of refugees. See id. (detailing numbers of refugees living in neighboring
countries). Syria alone has taken in 1.4 million Iraqis and receives 30,000 Iraqis
each month. See Paul Cochrane, Syria Facing Iraqi Refugee Crisis, INDEPENDENT
(London), June 10, 2007, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middleeast/article2640437.ece (reporting on stress that growing number of Iraqi refugees places
on Syrian infrastructure). Iraqis entering Syria receive a visa valid for fifteen days,
upon which they must apply for a longer stay. See Talea Miller, Iraq in Transition,
PBS ONLINE NEwsHouR, Mar. 21, 2007, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth-coverage/middle-east/iraq/jan-june7/refugees_03-21.html
(describing
admissions procedure at Iraqi-Syrian border). Jordan has an estimated 750,000
Iraqi refugees and Egypt has absorbed an additional 80,000 Iraqi refugees. See
Cockburn, supra (describing effects Iraqi violence has had on neighboring
countries).
25. See Debra Alban, Iraqi Refugees to Resettle Amid Fresh Trauma of Violent Past,
CNN NEWS, June 21, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/06/19/refugees.resettle/index.html?iref=newssearch (reporting on poor living conditions for millions
of Iraqis in camps throughout Iraq and neighboring countries). Since February
2007, violence has displaced an estimated 850,000 individuals within Iraq. See
Cockburn, supra note 24 (criticizing international community for not effectively
addressing growing refugee crisis).
26. See Meital Waibsnaider, How National Self-Interest and ForeignPolicy Continue
to Influence the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program,75 FoRDioAm L. REv. 391, 409 (2006)
("The current struggle has led to an environment in which those in the religious
minority in their neighborhoods are fleeing their homes for towns in which their
religion represents the majority.").
27. See Cockburn, supra note 24 (describing many difficulties of bringing humanitarian aid to growing numbers of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced
persons).
28. See Ann Curry, Iraqi refugee crisis in Syria, NBC NEWS, May 9, 2007, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18560456/ (reporting on difficult living conditions that
Iraqi refugees formerly experienced in Iraq and now experience in Syria, specifically regarding scant availability and affordability of medical treatment). One refugee, Ihab al-Jumaini, brought his three year old son Mustafa to Damascus because
hospitals in Baghdad had neither the drugs nor the doctors for his treatment. See
id. (recounting one refugee's efforts to find medical treatment for his son). Ihab
has no job, little money, and is having difficulty providing food for him and his son
while they seek treatment. See id. (detailing his limited resources in Syria). Doctors tell Ihab that even in Damascus, his son may die. See id. (describing deteriorating health of his son).
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29
Poverty is a harsh and inescapable reality for most Iraqi refugees.
While Iraqis may legally work in Syria, resources and opportunities remain
sparse. 3 0 In Jordan, Iraqis are not allowed to hold jobs, destining them to
a life of abject poverty once their scant savings run out.3 1 Relevantly, the
Third Circuit held that "the denial of an opportunity to earn a livelihood
...is the equivalent of a sentence of death by means of slow starvation and
none less final because it is gradual." 32 The high levels of poverty have
many disparate effects on refugee populations. 33 For example, many fe-

29. See H.R. 3674, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (finding that millions of displaced
Iraqis are living in increasing destitution and poverty).
30. See Curry, supra note 28 (describing difficult lives of Iraqi refugees living
in Syria).
31. See Miller, supra note 24 (describing difficult living conditions, poverty
and lack of employment opportunities available for Iraqi refugees now living in
Jordan).
32. Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744, 746 (3d Cir. 1962), superseded by statute as
recognized in In re T. Z., 24 I. & N. Dec. 163 (B.I.A. 2007) (recognizing that economic sanctions can constitute physical persecution in plea for stay of deportation); see also Kovav v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969) ("[A] probability of
deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage upon an alien for reasons of race, religion, or political opinion is sufficient to confer upon the Attorney
General the discretion to withhold deportation."). Some debate exists over
whether after Congress passed the Refugee Act in 1980, courts should still classify
economic persecution as persecution under United States immigration law. See
Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 222-23 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that while Board
of Immigration Appeals "held that the 1980 amendments had not altered the requirement that [sic] 'that harm or suffering must be inflicted upon an individual
in order to punish him for possessing a belief or characteristic, a persecutor seeks
to overcome,'" it "never discussed whether the pre-1980 standard for economic
persecution should similarly continue to govern"). The court referred to the Refugee Act that Congress adopted in 1980 to amend the Immigration and Nationality
Act. See Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (setting forth standards for persecution as understood in United States immigration law). The Board of Immigration Appeals has, on occasion, suggested that the economic persecution standard
still exists. See Matter of H-M, 20 I. & N. Dec. 683, 691 (B.I.A. 1993) (holding that
respondents' loss of ration card and job did not constitute sufficient economic
persecution); Matter of Barrera, 19 I. & N. Dec. 837 (B.I.A. 1989) (noting that
Board of Immigration Appeals' denial of asylum stemmed in part from fact that
group of Mariel Cubans had not claimed economic persecution-specifically that
"they have not "been denied employment, education, housing, permission to
travel, or other benefits of this sort"). The Board of Immigration Appeals, however, has failed to apply this standard consistently and subsequently, confusion still
exists as to whether it applies. See Minoyan, 457 F.3d at 221-22 ("Had the BIA in
past cases stated a standard for economic persecution, we might reasonably assume
that it applied that standard in the present case. But as far as we can determine
from a review of BIA decisions, the BIA had not applied a consistent standard.").
For a discussion of the economic duress suffered by refugees around the world, see
MICHELLE FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND SocIo-EcoNOMIC RIGHTS: REFUGE FROM DEPRIVATION 87-291 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
33. See Curry, supra note 28 (describing poor living conditions and limited
access to medical care for Iraqi refugees living in poverty); Elizabeth Palmer, Iraqi
Refugees Turn to Prostitution,CBS NEws, Feb.7, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/02/07/eveningnews/main2445663.shtml?source=search-story (discussing negative effects poverty has had on female refugees in particular).
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male Iraqi refugees in Syria have turned to prostitution, especially widows
whose husbands were murdered in Iraq and who are now the sole providers for their families. 34 Additionally, child labor and exploitation continues to grow in poor refugee neighborhoods.3 5 Mental and emotional
36
trauma plagues many Iraqi refugee children as well.
Certain groups of Iraqis, specifically members of religious minorities
and individuals who worked with the United States or its allies, are particularly at risk of becoming refugees. 3 7 Interpreters and other contractors
who assisted the United States military regularly face the threat of death at
the hands of militias and various insurgent groups.3 8 Iraqi Christians are

34. See Palmer, supra note 33 (reporting on growing number of Iraqi girls and
young women working as prostitutes in Syria to make money). Some female prostitutes are as young as fifteen years old. See id. ("[A] growing stream of men from
all over the Middle East is eager to prey on the most desperate refugees from the
war.").
35. See ASHLEYJONATHAN

CLEMENTS, WORLD VISION, TRAPPED!: UNLOCKING THE

3 (2007), availableat http://www.iraqichildren
trapped.org/Downloads/wv-report.pdf (reporting on concern that child labor is
growing in many poor refugee communities in Iraq and neighboring countries).
In the report, Clements writes that "[a]s family savings dry up and situations become more desperate, Iraq's refugee children will be under increasing pressure to
find jobs, risking exploitation." Id. (describing factors contributing to child labor
in poorer refugee neighborhoods). Conversely, the rights of refugee children in
the United States are well-established by the Supreme Court. See Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (holding that primary and secondary education must be
equally available to refugees as it is to citizens, regardless of their legal status). The
Court held that education is not "merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation." Id. (recognizing right of
refugee child in United States to equal education opportunities). Further, all refugees resettled in the United States are eligible for federal social services and assistance programs for up to seven years after their arrival. See John Fredriksson,
Bridgingthe Gap between Rights and Responsibilities:Policy ChangesAffecting Refugees and
Immigrants in the United States Since 1996, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 757, 762 (1999) (discussing social services available to refugees in United States).
36. See CLEMENTS, supra note 35, at 4 (reporting on incidents of panic attacks,
bed-wetting, sleeplessness and regular nightmares among young Iraqi refugee
children).
37. See S. 1651, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (finding that many "Iraqis associated
with the United States have fled Iraqi in fear of being killed or injured" and are
now refugees in surrounding region).
38. See id. ("Many Iraqis who have worked in critical positions in direct support of the United States Government in Iraq have been killed or injured in reprisals for their support of the American effort."); Anna Husarska, Refugee Scandal,
WALL ST. J., June 14, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl181788379670348
62.html?mod=googlenews wsj (describing constant targeting and murder of Iraqi
interpreters by insurgents for their past affiliation with American military); see also
Kirk W. Johnson, A Safe House for Iraqi Allies, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at A43,
available at http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-oe-johnsonl5
decl5,0,7899166.story?track=mostemailedlink (recounting story of Iraqi man who,
while working for United States Agency for International Development, received
death threats in note left with head of decapitated dog).
FUTURE OF IRAQI REFUGEE CHILDREN
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also heavily targeted by various armed groups. 39 Other vulnerable populations consist of ethnic minorities and nationalities that existed as refugees
40
in Iraq prior to 2003 and who are largely displaced once again.
Few options remain for the growing number of Iraqi refugees. 41 Most
42
neighboring countries have essentially sealed off their borders to Iraqis.
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey and Iran have allowed entrance to only a
handful of Iraqis.4 3 Jordan no longer allows Iraqi males between the ages
of eighteen and thirty-five to enter the country, forcing many families to
either break apart or flee to the already overcrowded refugee neighborhoods in Syria. 44 Refugee resettlement in the United States, which the
government suspended for two months after the terrorist attacks of Sep39. See Iraq's ChristianMinority Flees Violence, CBS NEws, May 7, 2007, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/07/iraq/main2766003.shtml
("Although Islamic extremists have targeted Iraqi Christians before, bombing churches and
threatening religious leaders... [now] [m]any Christians are being expelled from
their homes and forced to leave their possessions behind .... "); see alsoJoseph T.
Kassab, Statement to United States Department of State on Fiscal Year 2007 Refugee Admissions Program (June 28, 2006) (transcript available from the Chaldean
Federation of America) (describing increased targeting and subsequent exodus of
Christian populations in Iraq). Additionally, increasing incidents of attacks and
kidnappings of Iraqi Christians have caused half of Christian population to flee the
country. See Iraq's ChristianMinority Flees Violence, supra (reporting on mass exodus
of Christian population from Iraq, now largely refugees, resulting from targeted
violence).
40. See H.R. 3674, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) ("Iraq itself hosts more than 43,000
refugees from other countries, many of whom were refugees prior to 2003 and
who have been displaced in Iraq for a second time, including many Palestinians.");
RHODA MARGESSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IRAQI REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS: A DEEPENING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS? 3 (2007), available at

http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33936.pdf (discussing vulnerable populations
of long-time refugees living within Iraq). This group includes Palestinians, Iraqi
Christians, Iranian Ahwazis, Sabean-Mandeans, Shi'a Turkmen, the Roma, Baghdad and Basra Kurds, Iranian Kurds, Sudanese and Syrian Arabs. See MARGESSON,
supra, at 3-4 (detailing composition of long-time refugees and displaced persons in
Iraq, totaling over 51,000). Further, of the nearly 300,000 refugees who returned
to Iraq in the years immediately following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the
majority are once again displaced. See id. (detailing cyclical displacement of many
refugees that exists, largely consisting of Iraqis returning from Iran to Southern
Iraq).
41. For a discussion of the limited options Iraqi refugees have when fleeing
Iraq, see infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
42. See Iraq: Plight of Refugees Worsens as Syria,JordanImpose Restrictions, REUTERS
(June 17, 2007), http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/39
81375bf7b6a484e019c6eabbb366e7.htm (reporting on deteriorating conditions
for Iraqi refugees throughout Middle East).
43. See id. (reporting on refusal of many neighboring countries to allow Iraqi
refugees into their country).
ALERTNET

44. See Miller, supra note 24 (reporting how neighboring countries are restricting admission of Iraqi refugees, especially adult males). Miller notes that
"[f] ears that sectarian violence will spill into surrounding countries with refugees is
a concern throughout the region." Id. (discussing Jordan's motivations for restricting entrance of adult males into its territory).
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tember 11, remains low. 45 To date, the United States has done little to
alleviate this growing refugee problem. 46 As a result of the United States'
passive response, the millions of Iraqis in and around Iraq are left with a
Iraq or endure increasingly
difficult choice: brave an ever more dangerous
47
decrepit living conditions as refugees.
III.

LEGAL PROTECTION AVAILABLE TO IRAQI REFUGEES

Iraqi refugees seeking safety and legal protection have distinct but
limited resources from which to turn. 48 International law for refugees has
developed steadily since its inception in the mid-twentieth century. 49 In
addition, refugees may also utilize legal protection offered through
50
United States domestic law.
45. See Eleanor Acer, Refuge in an Insecure Time: Seeking Asylum in the Post-9/11
INT'L L.J. 1361, 1368-69 (2005) (describing two-month
United States, 28 FoRDHAm
suspension of United States Resettlement Program by Bush Administration and
decreased numbers of refugees resettled in United States following its reinstatement); Waibsnaider, supra note 26, at 412 ("The extent to which admissions from
the Near East and South Asia have failed to rebound in proportion to everywhere
else is significant."). Additionally, Acer writes that "[e]ven after resettlement resumed, though, the pace of resettlement was so slow that thousands of refugees
each year were left stranded in difficult and dangerous conditions." Acer, supra, at
1369 (noting lingering delays in refugee resettlement after its suspension following
September 11 terrorist attacks).
46. See Sudarsan Raghavan, U.N. Decries Neglect of Iraqi Refugees: Increased Support Urged for Leading Host Countries Syria and Jordan,WASH. POST, July 7, 2007, at
All, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
07/06/AR2007070602049.html (detailing inefficient resettlement of Iraqi refugees
by United States). As of July 2007, the United States has resettled fewer than 800
Iraqis since 2003. See id. (providing recent statistics of refugee resettlement in
United States). Sweden, by contrast, has resettled more than 18,000 since only
2006. See id. (comparing Swedish refugee resettlement program with that of
United States). Sweden has since announced it will make the asylum process more
difficult for Iraqis and forcibly deport any Iraqi denied refuge. See id. (describing
Sweden's changing asylum and refugee policies). In April and May of 2007, the
United States resettled only one Iraqi refugee in each month. See Husarska, Refugee
Scandal, supra note 38 (criticizing low number of Iraqi refugees that United States
has resettled). More recently, the main countries of asylum for Iraqi refugees are
Iran, Germany, the Netherlands, Syria and the United Kingdom; not the United
States. See U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEES BY NUMBERS 2006 8 (2006),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/4523bObb2.pdf (providing recent statistics for origins of ten largest refugee populations throughout world as of
Jan. 1, 2006).
47. For a discussion of the violence and poverty that affect many Iraqis, see
supra notes 23-47 and accompanying text.
48. For a discussion of the limited legal protections that exist for Iraqi refugees, see infra notes 50-71 and accompanying text.
49. For a discussion of the international law pertaining to refugees and its
historical development, see infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
50. For a discussion of the United States domestic law pertaining to refugees
and its historical development, see infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
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429

Legal Protectionfrom InternationalLaw

The United Nations established the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") to lead and coordinate international efforts to protect refugees and resolve developing migration
crises. 51 International legal protection for refugees dates back to the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, enacted to address the ref52
ugee crisis in Europe following World War II, and its 1967 Protocol.
The Convention sets out the obligations signatory states have to refugees
in their territory, such as ensuring a refugee's right to fair treatment for
employment, education and housing. 53 The UNHCR establishes and
51. See U.N.

HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HELPING REFUGEES: AN INTRODUC-

UNHCR 4 (2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/
420795964.pdf (providing brief history of UNHCR operations); Marilyn Achiron,
A 'Timeless' Treaty Under Attack, REFUGEES, Vol. 2, No. 123, at 8 (2001), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3b5e90ea0.pdf (laying out history and motivations of various international efforts addressing refugee crises). After the end of
World War II, political leaders of the intemational community created the
UNHCR to deal initially with the nearly one million refugees spread throughout
Europe. See Achiron, supra (discussing international community's motivations for
creating UNHCR).
52. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (1967) (expanding upon legal rights of refugees); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, art 12-34
(1954) (providing first international legal duties of signatory states to refugees
within their territory). The obligations set forth in the Convention and its Protocol give the UNHCR an important function. See Ray Wilkinson, The Refugee Convention at 50, REFUGEES, Vol. 2, No. 123, at 2 (2001), available at http://
www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3b5e9OeaO.pdf (arguing for UNHCR's relevance in
modern world). A year after the UNHCR's inception, twenty-six countries signed
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which remains "a cornerstone of protection" for refugees. See id. (discussing continued need for Convention and its protections). Though the United States never signed the Convention,
it maintains that "[t] he humanitarian principles enshrined in the 1951 Convention
are as fundamental today as they were fifty years ago, and must remain so." AlanJ.
Kreczko, Asst. Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, Statement of the United States of
America at the Ministerial Meeting of State Parties to the 1951 Convention and its
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Dec. 12, 2001), available at http:/
/usmission.ch/press200l/l2l2kreczko.htm (praising Convention on its fiftieth
anniversary).
53. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supranote 52, art. 12-34
(setting out obligations that signatory states have regarding treatment of refugees
within their territory). Article 4 of the Convention provides that "[c]ontracting
States shall accord to refugees within their territories treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to their nationals with respect to freedom to practice their
religion and freedom as regards the religious education of their children." Id. art.
4 (protecting refugees' right to religious freedom). Article 16 provides that refugees shall have the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access to
the courts. See id. art. 16 (protecting refugees' right to access courts). Article 17
provides that "[c]ontracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their
territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country
in the same circumstances, as regard the right to engage in wage-earning employment." Id. art. 17 (protecting refugees' right to employment). Article 20 provides
that when a country instates a rationing system for products in short supply, refugees and nationals must receive equal treatment. See id. art. 20 (protecting refuTION TO
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maintains many refugee camps in Iraq and neighboring countries that
provide protection and basic humanitarian services to refugees. 54 The
UNHCR's Executive Committee has stressed that resettlement remains "an
important tool of refugee protection and a durable solution for many refugees," and that "the use of resettlement should be expanded in the future." 5 5 In their operations throughout the world, UNHCR officials may
register refugees, provide them with protection documents for their identification and coordinate with countries like the United States to facilitate
56
their resettlement.
Despite its honorable ambitions, the UNHCR has been incapable of
efficiently addressing the needs of the millions of Iraqi refugees that now
exist.5 7 Though the UNHCR has established several camps along the Iraqi
border and in neighboring countries, it has no independent ability to
transplant these refugees to other countries. 58 Additionally, the UNHCR
has no mechanism through which to determine whether signatory states
are meeting their treaty obligations, nor to enforce compliance. 59 The
Iraqi government prohibits most Iraqis of Palestinian descent from reengees' right to access rationing system). Article 22 provides that "[c]ontracting
States shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with
respect to elementary education." Id. art. 22 (protecting refugees' right to education). Finally, Article 23 provides that refugees must receive equal treatment from
contracting states with respect to public relief and assistance. See id. art. 23 (protecting refugees' right to public relief and assistance).
54. See Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, The W Visa: A Legislative Proposalfor Female
and Child Refugees Trapped in a Post-September 11 World, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 459,
462 (2005) (describing primary functions of UNHCR); see also Iraq-Syria:Plight of
PalestinianRefugees in Border Camps Worsens, REUTERS ALERTNET (June 27, 2007),
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/5bb99eO7b1O4ae0bd6a5ff35f
d2f40a6.htm (reporting on three camps that UNHCR has established in Iraq and
Syria along border for Iraqi refugees).
55. See U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESETTLEMENT
POLICY AND PRACTICE 8 (2001), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/
vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=search&docid=3dalb32b2 (reciting UNHCR's guiding
principles, including continued dedication to resettlement of refugees).
56. See U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) Frequently
Asked Questions-IraqiProcessing (May 3, 2007), http://www.state.gov/g/prm/rls/
fs/84207.htm (explaining legal resources available to Iraqis).
57. See Geoff Gilbert, Protection after September 11, 15 INr'L J. REFUGEE L. 1, 2
(2003) (discussing inability of UNHCR to ensure that countries recognize rights of
refugees).
58. See Iraq-Syria: Plight of Palestinian Refugees in Border Camps Worsens, supra
note 54 (reporting that over 1,000 refugees remain stranded and in humanitarian
need in two camps along Iraqi border).
59. See Gilbert, supra note 57, at 2 (discussing problems with determining and
enforcing compliance with 1951 Convention Relating to Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol). There is some debate regarding whether the UNHCR has the
implicit right to ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion regarding a member states' fulfillment of its treaty obligations, though the UNHCR
has never attempted such a maneuver. See id. (discussing potential role of International Court ofJustice with enforcing 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol) (citing Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11)).
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tering the country, a policy that the UNHCR cannot violate, which strands
thousands of Iraqis on the border if they cannot gain entrance to a neigh60
The UNHCR is further inhibited by Jordan, Syria and
boring country.
Lebanon's refusal to join either the 1950 Convention relating to the Status
61
of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol.

B.

Legal Protection Under United States Law

In addition to international law, the United States has its own legislation and policies pertaining to refugees from all over the world, including
Iraq. 6 2 The United States regulates the admission and resettlement of ref60. See H.R. 3674, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) ("Palestinian refugee camps in Iraq
near the Syrian andJordanian borders remain in dire need of humanitarian assistance."); see also Iraq-Syria:Plight of PalestinianRefugees in Border Camps Worsens, supra
note 54 (describing plight of stateless Palestinian refugees along border). The
Iraqi government does not recognize Iraqis of Palestinian decent as citizens, even
persons born and raised in Iraq, and refuses to issue them Iraqi passports. See IraqSyria: Plight of PalestinianRefugees in Border Camps Worsens, supra note 54 (reporting
on how Iraqi-Palestinians who cannot get through international borders into
neighboring countries are then unable to return to their homes in Iraq); see also
Iraq: The World's Fastest Growing Refugee Crisis, Refugees International (Aug.
7
29, 2007), http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/96 9
the
Al
("Three hundred and seventy-two Palestinians from Iraq are living near
Tanf border crossing between Iraq and Syria in a makeshift refugee camp located
in the no man's land between both borders."). Similar camps also exist in Jordan.
See Iraq: The World's Fastest Growing Refugee Crisis, supra (reporting on dozens of
Palestinians languishing since April 2003 and awaiting resettlement). Palestinian
Iraqis are among targeted groups frequently attacked by gunmen and have significant incentive to flee Iraq. See id. ("Many Iraqis resent the preferential treatment
Palestinians received under Saddam Hussein's regime. As a result, several militia
and sectarian groups have singled out Palestinians as recipients of a collective
"fatwa" (or death sentence)."); see also Wadie Said, The Palestiniansin Lebanon: The
Rights of the Victims of the Palestinian-IsraeliPeaceProcess, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
315 (1999) (providing further discussion of difficulties facing Palestinian refugees
as stateless individuals in Middle East). Another group of vulnerable third country
nationals is the Iranian Kurds. See Iraq: The World's Fastest Growing Refugee Crisis,
supra (reporting that over 500 Iranian Kurds live in refugee camps in Jordan or
along Iraqi-Jordanian border).
61. See U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, STATES PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL, at 4 (Oct.
1, 2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.
pdPtbl=PROTECTION&id=3b73b0d63 (providing list of signatory states to Convention and its Protocol); see also Kristele Younes, Iraq: Refugees Under Pressure in
Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Radio Free Europe (Feb. 16, 2007), http://www.rferl.org/
(explaining
featuresarticle/2007/02/7f2cldd6-8c16-4c91-90f-36319c5e34cf.html
that Syria, Jordan and Lebanon neither recognize refugee status nor are parties to
1951 Convention Relating to Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol).
62. See Daniel J. Steinbock, The Qualities of Mercy: Maximizing the Impact of U.S.
Refugee Resettlement, 36 U. MICH.J. L. REFORM 951, 954-55 (2003) (describing three
main legal purposes for refugee resettlement in United States). The United States
chooses refugees for resettlement based on (1) the need to remove "persons from
situations that put their lives or well being at serious risk," (2) "to further U.S.
foreign policy goals" or (3) to "facilitate family reunion, recruit skilled labor, or
further other traditional immigration purposes." See id. (examining three bases
for which United States will resettle refugees). In the United States, the task of
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ugees through the Immigration and Nationality Act. 63 Further, the
United States is a party to the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and must adopt policies to be in compliance with these international
obligations. 64 In its relevant parts, the Protocol preserved the basic obligations of the 1951 Convention, incorporated its definition of a refugee and
modified the Convention to address the changing characteristics of modern refugee crises. 65 Under the system, refugees may apply for resettlement in the United States based on a compelling need, a referral from the
UNHCR, their membership within certain vulnerable minority groups or
on the principle of family reunification if the applicant has family members already living in the United States. 66 Additionally, the United States
resettling refugees is further complicated by the lack of a single agency to deal with
refugee issues, and instead, the involvement of many federal agencies with their
own mandates. See Fredriksson, supra note 35, at 758-59 (discussing responsibilities
regarding refugee resettlement for Department of State, Department of Health
and Human Services, Department ofJustice, and to smaller extent, Department of
Labor).
63. See generally Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 117 (1980) (amending Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 to allow for refugee admission and resettlement in United States).
64. See STATES PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES AND THE

1967

PROTOCOL,

supra note 61, at 14 (providing list of signatory

states to Convention and its Protocol).
65. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 52, art. 1 (setting out general provisions and obligations of Protocol); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 438 (1987) ("Although the United States has never been party to the
1951 Convention, it is a party to the Protocol, which incorporates the Convention's
definition [of a refugee] in relevant part."); see also Most Frequently Asked Questions
About the Refugee Convention, REFUGEES, Vol. 2, No. 123, at 16 (2001), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3b5e90ea0.pdf (describing main functions
and modifications of 1967 Protocol). The 1951 Convention provides the following
definition for a refugee:
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear,
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 52, art. 1, § A(2). The
Protocol "removes the geographical and time limitations written into the original
Convention under which mainly Europeans involved in events occurring before 1
January 1951, could apply for refugee status." Most Frequently Asked Questions About
the Refugee Convention, supra (explaining how Protocol moved beyond refugee issues stemming from World War II to address changing refugee crisis of late twentieth century).
66. See MARGESSON, supra note 40, at 12-13 (describing basic prioritization system Department of State utilizes for refugee admission and resettlement in United
States). The priority categories cover: (1) "compelling protection cases and individuals for whom no durable solution exists, who are referred to the U.S. refugee
program by the [UNHCR], a U.S. embassy, or a designated nongovernmental organization"; (2) "groups of special humanitarian concern to the United States,"
including "specific groups within certain nationalities, clans, or ethnic groups";
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Department of State recently created the Iraqi Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Task Force to take charge of coordinating assistance and
resettlement for Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons in Iraq
67
and the surrounding area.
The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the United States' subsequent military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan have profoundly affected United States' refugee policies. 68 For example, a limited number
of individuals and their families who worked for the United States military
and meet certain specified conditions now qualify for special immigrant
visas. 69 To allow for this program, Congress added a provision to the National Defense Authorization Act for Iraqi or Afghani translators who
worked directly with the United States Armed Forces for a period of at
and (3) "family reunification cases involving spouses, unmarried children under
age 21, and parents of persons who were admitted to the United States as refugees
or granted asylum." Id. (detailing composition of three prioritized categories for
refugee admission and resettlement into United States).
67. See Sean McCormack, U.S. Dep't of State, Secretary of State Establishes New
Iraq Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Task Force (Feb. 5, 2007), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80090.htm (announcing creation of
Task Force by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice). The Task Force specifically
aims to address needs of Iraqis targeted because of past affiliation with the United
States military:
Our key immediate objectives are to assist internally displaced Iraqis and
Iraqi refugees by building up the capacities of UN agencies and NGOs.
This includes increasing opportunities for permanent resettlement for
the most vulnerable Iraqis, to establish specialized programs to assist
Iraqis who are at risk because of their employment or close association
with the United States Government, to work diplomatically with regional

governments through bilateral and multilateral channels to uphold the
principle of first asylum.
PaulaJ. Dobrianski, Under Sec'y for Democracy and Global Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
State, Briefing with U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees Antonio Guterres, and Asst.
Sec'y for Population, Refugees, and Migration Ellen Sauerbrey (Feb. 14, 2007),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rm/80532.htm (explaining objectives of
Task Force).

68. See Waibsnaider, supra note 26, at 391-92 (discussing how United States'
war on terror was primary motivation for changes in refugee admissions policies
for Iraq).
69. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-163, § 1059, 119 Stat. 3136, 3443 (adding provision giving special consideration for former Iraqi or Afghani translators who worked for United States military).
The individual must obtain both proof issued by the United States Armed Forces
that he or she worked as a translator for at least twelve months and a written recommendation from a General in the chain of command of the United States
Armed Forces unit that the translator supported. See id. § 1059(b) (1), 119 Stat. at
3444 (describing requirements for special status visas that are available to former
Iraqi or Afghani interpreters who worked for United States military); see also U.S.
Dep't of State, Immigrant Visas: Information on Special Immigrant Status for Persons
Serving as Translatorswith the United States Armed Forces (Aug. 29, 2006), available at
http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/special-immigrantvisa.html (describing requirements of program for special immigrant status).
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least twelve months. 70 Once translators receive adjusted status or their
immigrant visas, their spouses and non-adult children may also qualify to
71
join them in the United States.
IV.

NECESSITY OF REFORM IN UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION LAW AND

POLICY PERTAINING TO IRAQI REFUGEES

Though certain protections exist for Iraqi refugees, there are ample
shortcomings of both the UNHCR and the United States refugee resettlement program. 72 First, some of the seemingly basic requirements for refugee resettlement may prove unreasonably burdensome for many refugees
due to the realities of the Iraqi refugee crisis. 73 Second, the United States
government has failed to effectively implement a well-designed program
for refugee resettlement. 74 Third, the material support provision imbedded in the Immigration and Nationality Act unreasonably prevents
thousands of harmless Iraqi refugees from resettling in the United States
because it has an overly-broad definition of a terrorist organization and it
75
fails to create a duress exception to the resettlement bar.
70. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 § 1059, 119
Stat. at 3443 (adding provision giving special consideration for former Iraqi or
Afghani translators who worked for United States military). The provision allows
the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide a translator with special immigrant
status under the Immigration and Nationality Act. See id. § 1059(a) (detailing provision of special immigrant status).
71. See id. § 1059(b) (2), 119 Stat. at 3444 (providing for resettlement of immediate family members of Iraqi and Afghani translators approved for refugee
resettlement in United States).
72. See Acer, supra note 45, at 1368-69 (discussing long delays in resettlement
of Iraqi refugees in United States); see also Jennie Pasquarella, Victims of Terror
Stopped at the Gate to Safety: The Impact of Material Support to TerrorismBar on Refugees,
13 No. 3 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 28, 29-32 (2006), available at http://www.wcl.american.
edu/hrbrief/13/133.pdPrd=l (criticizing problems with United States immigration law and policy). Pasquarella writes that three major problems exist: (1) current immigration law and policy operates under a definition of terrorism that
commingles refugees with terrorists; (2) the material support provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act includes immaterial support; and (3) refugees victimized by terrorists have no duress defense. See id. (discussing significant
problems posed by United States immigration law and policy for Iraqi refugees).
Additionally, the United States failed to achieve its goal for the number of Iraqi
refugees that it resettles. SeeJamie Tarabay, Bombings Underscore U.N. Report on Iraqi
Deaths, NAT'L PUB. RADio, Jan. 16, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=6874414 (reporting that "the U.S. government fell short of its
pledge to resettle 500 Iraqi refugees in the 2006 fiscal year" and only resettled 202
individuals).
73. For a discussion of the requirements Iraqis must meet before qualifying
for refugee resettlement in the United States, see infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
74. For a discussion of the United States government's implementation of existing refugee resettlement programs, see infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
75. For a discussion of the material support bar for refugees, see infra notes
86-117 and accompanying text.
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Unreasonable Burden Placed on Iraqi Refugees by United States
Resettlement Requirements

Iraqi refugees encounter unreasonable difficulty in receiving protection from the United States government. 76 Asylum protection is only
available to Iraqis who physically make it to the United States and offers no
77
protection to the millions of refugees who remain in the Middle East.
Meeting the burden of proof for refugees seeking protection in the
United States is no easy task, and immigration judges have occasionally
required excessive showings of proof on the applicant's part. 78 Complicat76. See Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 452-53 (6th Cir. 2007) (rejecting Board
of Immigration Appeals' affirmation of immigration judge's decision denying Iraqi
Chaldean's request for asylum). In Elias, the Sixth Circuit also found that the immigration judge had badgered the Iraqi refugee, that he was inappropriately sarcastic and that his intemperate behavior had negatively affected the Iraqi's
testimony. See id. at 52 (noting improper behavior of immigration judge). Other
courts have similarly denied legal protection to Iraqis. See Gulla v. Gonzales, 498
F.3d 911, 917-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting Board of Immigration Appeals' affirmation of immigration judge's decision to deny Iraqi Chaldean's request for asylum,
despite demonstrating credible evidence of past persecution and likelihood of future persecution and torture if he returned to Iraq). In Gulla, the Ninth Circuit
held that the immigration judge ignored not only the significance of the presence
of the refugee's family in the United States, but also the complexity of balancing
discretionary factors when considering whether the refugee should have previously
applied for protection in other counties. See id. (rejecting previous holding of immigration judge). Other courts have applied a very narrow definition for what
constitutes torture. See A1-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2001)
(rejecting Board of Immigration Appeals' holding that Iraqi man's arrests did not
amount to torture, when those arrests included beatings and being burned with
cigarettes). In AI-Saher, where the Board of Immigration Appeals had previously
affirmed deportation of the Iraqi refugee, the Ninth Circuit went on to remand
the case to the Board. See id. at 1148 (ruling that Board of Immigration Appeals
shall grant withholding of removal).
77. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1) (2005) (stating that authority to apply for asylum applies to "any alien who is physically present
in the United States or who arrives in the United States") (emphasis added). Iraqi
asylum-seekers were further disadvantaged by Operation Liberty Shield, a program
put forth in part by the United States Department of Homeland Security. See Acer,
supra note 45, at 1379 (describing policy whereby United States government detained all asylum-seekers from nations where al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda sympathizers and
other terrorist groups operate). Asylum-seekers from these Arab countries were
universally detained, including those who met the required parole criteria and
posed no threat to the public. See id. (discussing effect of Operation Liberty Shield
for Arab asylum-seekers).
78. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (rebuffing attempts
by Board of Immigration to place excessively-high burden of proof on refugees
seeking asylum in United States). At deportation proceedings against a Nicaraguan citizen who sought protection from political persecution in her home country, the immigration judge applied the same standard in evaluating her claim for
withholding deportation as he did in evaluating her application of asylum. See id.
at 424-25. (discussing burden of proof that applicant must meet). On appeal, the
Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and imposed a burden of proof requiring
her to show that it is more likely than not that she will be persecuted in her home
country. See id. at 425 (discussing Board's ruling on required burden of proof).
The Supreme Court ruled otherwise, holding that the standard of proof imposed
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ing matters further, Iraqi refugees who first fled to Syria or Jordan to escape violence before turning to the United States for safety may be
ineligible for both refugee and asylum protection because they did not
come directly from Iraq to the United States. 7 9 Courts in the United
States have not clearly decided whether such refugees are considered
firmly resettled under the law and thereby barred from refugee resettlement and asylum protection in the United States.8 0
B.

Failure to Implement Refugee Resettlement Programsfor Iraqi Refugees

Another serious shortcoming with the United States immigration policy towards Iraqis is its overwhelming failure to implement resettlement
by the Board of Immigration Appeals was excessive and too restrictive. See id. at
449-50 (rejecting Board of Immigration Appeals' ruling). The Court stated that
"[olur holding today increases that flexibility [given to the United States in the
Refugee Act of 1980] by rejecting the Government's contention that the Attorney
General may not even consider granting asylum to one who fails to satisfy the strict
§ 243(h) standard [for withholding deportation]." Id. (summarizing its ruling on
burden of proof that is required for applicant).
79. See Eligibility for Admission of Refugees, 8 C.F.R. § 207.1 (2007) (barring
any applicant who has become firmly resettled in foreign country from receiving
refugee resettlement in United States). Under United States immigration law, "[a]
refugee is considered to be 'firmly resettled' if he/she has been offered resident
status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement by a country
other than the United States and has travelled to and entered that country as a
consequence of his/her flight from persecution." Id. § 207.1(b) (providing definition for "firmly resettled"). Further, a refugee who claims not to be firmly resettled must establish that the conditions of his or her residence in that country are
so restrictive as to deny resettlement. See id. § 207.1(c) (detailing required showings for refugee applicants who must prove they are not firmly resettled in another
country).
80. See 8 C.F.R. § 207.1(c) (limiting consideration to conditions under which
other residents of the country live). Under the Code, judges consider: (1)
"[w]hether permanent or temporary housing is available to the refugee in the foreign country"; (2) the "nature of employment available to the refugee in the foreign country," and (3) "other benefits offered or denied to the refugee by the
foreign country which are available to other residents," such as the fight to property ownership, travel documentation, education, public welfare and citizenship.
See id. (listing considerations for firm resettlement analysis); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 207.1 (providing similar definition of firm resettlement for asylum proceedings).
But see Gulla, 498 F.3d at 917-18 (stating that courts should also consider claimant's
safety, whether orderly refugee procedures were available to help refugees inany
country they passed through, whether claimant made any attempts to seek asylum
before coming to United States and whether claimant had reasonable fears discouraging application to other countries). In Gulla, the Ninth Circuit stressed that
the immigration judge should consider the general context through which the
refugee has fled his or her home country. See id. at 918 (recommending that immigration judges undertake more contextual approach for firmly resettled analysis).
Specifically, the court states that anti-Arab tensions that exist following the terrorist
attacks of September 11 might discourage many refugees from initiating the asylum process until they are actually inside the United States, as opposed to other
countries through which they have travelled along the way. See id. (illustrating
possible factors that immigration judges might consider).
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programs in a timely manner. 8 1 The numbers that the United States allocated for refugee resettlement in 2006 and 2007-both the number first
proposed by the Department of State as the intended goal and the much
lower number of Iraqi refugees that actually resettled in the United
States-were significantly inadequate given the magnitude of the Iraqi refugee crisis. 82 The United States established a goal to resettle 7,000 Iraqi
refugees in 2007, but only weeks later, adjusted this number to only 2,000
individuals. 83 While some Iraqi Christians are obtaining refugee resettlement in the United States, other vulnerable groups remain largely forgotten. 84 The United States government's failure to allocate sufficient
personnel and funding continues to delay the already slow resettlement
85
process.
C.

The Material Support Provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act

Shortcomings in recent legislation designed to combat terrorism further inhibit many refugees from obtaining legal protection in the United
States. 86 Since Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1990, any person
81. See H.R. 2486, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (discussing current failure of
United States government to process Iraqi refugees). The proposed legislation
finds that the United States government has previously resettled massive amounts
of refugees in a short period of time. See id. (recognizing that between May 1, 1975
and December 20, 1975, United States government facilitated movement of over
131,000 South Vietnamese political refugees to United States). The United States
government has resettled significantly fewer Iraqi refugees over a greater length of
time. See id. (finding that United States admitted 692 Iraqi refugees between 2003
and 2007).
82. See H.R. 3674, 110th Cong. §§ 7-8 (2007) ("The United States pledged to
resettle 7,000 Iraqi refugees in 2007, later reduced to 2,000, a commitment which
has yet to be met."); Tarabay, supra note 72 (discussing how United States government "fell short of its pledge to resettle 500 Iraqi refugees in the 2006 fiscal year
*

.

. it only resettled 202").

83. See IraqiRefugees: Resettlement Questions and Answers, REFUGEE COUNCIL USA
(Sept. 5, 2007), available at http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/10173 (reporting on likely number of Iraqi refugees that United States
will process in 2007).
84. See id. (discussing how Brazil has agreed to resettle 100 Palestinian Iraqis,
while United States has taken only four).
85. See Crocker Urges Iraq Refugee Action, BBC NEWS, Sept. 17, 2007, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/6998372.stm (reporting that United States Department of Homeland Security has only small number of officers in Jordan to
conduct security reviews of Iraqi refugees). Due to insufficient staffing, resettlement applicants must wait eight to ten months after being referred to United
States authorities by the UNHCR. See id. (suggesting current list of 10,000 applicants UNHCR recommended to United States might take two years to process).
86. See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of
2001 [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act], Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411, 115 Stat. 272,
345 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182 to enhance material support provision barring refugee resettlement to certain applicants); Real I.D. Act, Division B of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief [hereinafter Real I.D. Act], Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 103, 119 Stat.
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who gives material support to terrorists or a terrorist organization is
barred from resettlement in the United States.8 7 Congress's definition of
material support was significantly broad, and includes monetary contributions such as ransom payments.8 8 Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act and the Real I.D. Act, meant in part to amend
this provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act.8 9 The legislation
provides that the ban applies if material support is given notjust to groups
recognized as terrorist organizations by the United States Department of
State, but, additionally, to any "group of two or more individuals, whether
organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in,
terrorist activity." 90 Since the definition of terrorist activity under United
231, 306 (2005) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182 to broaden definition of terrorist organization as it pertains to material support provision).
87. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (iv) (VI)
(2006) (setting forth law prohibiting entry to aliens who have provided material
support to terrorist organization); see also U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, "MaterialSupport" and Related Bars to Refugee ProtectionSummary of Key Provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, at 2 (2006), available at http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/
pdfs/ms-summ-unhcrkeyprovl2-06.pdf (describing development of material support provision in Immigration and Nationality Act). Under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, a person "has engaged in a terrorist activity" if he or she "commits
an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support"
to either a terrorist organization or a person engaged in terrorist activity. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (iv) (VI) (2006) (explaining meaning of material support provision).
88. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (iv) (VI)
(stating provision regarding material support for terrorists or terrorist organizations). The term "material support" means any property or service, including "currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging,
training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel and transportation." See 18 U.S.C. § 2239A(b)(1) (2006). The
Third Circuit has also found that it was not arbitrary or capricious for an administrative agency to determine refugees who provided food and set up tents, for a
religious congregation that might have contained members of a militant sect constituted material support. See Sing-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 298-99 (3d Cir.
2004) (defining material support).
89. See USA PATRIOT Act § 411 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2005)); Real
I.D. Act § 103 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2005)).
90. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (vi) (IIII) (a) (3) (B) (vi) (I)-(III) (2005) (describing three tiers of terrorist organizations).
Tier I terrorist organizations, known as foreign terrorist organizations, are designated by the United States Secretary of State. See "MaterialSupport" and Related Bars
to Refugee Protection Summary of Key Provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
supra note 87, at 1 ("The consequences of a Tier I designation includes freezing of
organizational assets, criminal prosecutions for those found to have provided 'material support' to . . . [a foreign terrorist organization], and inadmissibility to the
United States for those who provide support to or are affiliated with ... [the organization]."). Tier II terrorist organizations are also designated by the Department of State, but association or support for them does not invoke criminal
consequences. See id. ("The consequences of a Tier II designation is primarily in-
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States immigration law is broad in nature, many unorganized but armed
militias roaming Iraq classify as official terrorist organizations under the
law.

91

1. Material Support Provided Under Duress
The recent amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act pose
significant problems for many Iraqis who gave money away under threat of
death to themselves or their families. 9 2 As one Board of Immigration Appeals judge declared, the material support provision is "breathtaking in its
scope." 9 3 Further, the law creates no exception for those cases where individuals provide the support involuntarily or under great duress. 9 4 Technically, refugees can assert a defense that they did not have actual or
constructive knowledge that they were supporting a terrorist organization. 9 5 The Board of Immigration Appeals, however, rejected the argument that a link must exist between the provision of material support and
the intended use of the assistance by the terrorist organization to further
96

terrorist activity.
Though it does not textually exist in the legislation, an exception to
the material support bar might exist where support was not given voluntarily, but rather, under duress. 97 The Supreme Court has long-recognized
admissibility to the United States for those who provide support to or are affiliated
with the organization."). Tier III terrorist organizations are any group of individuals who engage in terrorist activity. See id. at 1-2. ("[E]ssentially any resistance or
rebel group that is engaged in armed conflict with its government would be considered a 'Tier III' terrorist organization."). At present, three groups operate in
Iraq that the Department of State recognizes as terrorist organizations. See U.S.
Dep't of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) (2006), available at http://
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm (listing Ansar al-Islam, al-Qa'ida and Tanzim
Qa'idat al-Jihad fi bilad al-Rafidayn).
91. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (iii) (V)
(2005) (defining "terrorist activity" as including "the use of any explosive, firearm,
or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary
gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more
individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.").
92. For a discussion of potential problems for Iraqi refugees posed by new
legislation, see infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
93. See In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 948 (B.I.A. 2006) (Osuna, J., concurring) (describing broad expanse of material support bar in Immigration and Nationality Act).
94. See Pasquarella, supra note 72, at 28 (describing principal problems with
material support bar in Immigration and Nationality Act).
95. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (iv) (IV)
(2005) (providing that alleged act does not constitute material support if "the solicitor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know,
and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist
organization").
96. See In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 943-44 (limiting defense available to material support bar when claimant claims to have lacked actual or constructive knowledge that organization was terrorist organization).
97. See Arias v. Gonzales, 143 F. App'x. 464, 468 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that
Colombian man was denied permanent entry into United States because he volun-
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duress as a defense in criminal law. 9 8 Further, the Court has suggested
that individuals may be able to raise duress as a common law defense in
criminal proceedings even when the conduct in question violates criminal
statues that lack any express duress exception. 99 The Supreme Court previously found duress to exist when one demonstrates that, "given the imminence of the threat," violation of the law "was his only reasonable
alternative."10 0 Even if a duress exception to the material support bar
does exist, however, recent rulings suggest it will not prove to be an effective alternative. 10 1 In past cases, the Supreme Court seemingly maintains
that duress might not necessarily exist even when one acts under the
threat of death to one's family members. 10 2 Immigration judges throughtarily provided support to terrorist organization). The Colombian man had made
payments to a Colombian paramilitary organization designated as a terrorist organization by the Department of State, but the court found he voluntarily made these
payments because he was never expressly threatened by the organization to make
payments, among other reasons. See id. (explaining court's reasoning).
98. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409 (1980) (describing use of
duress as common law defense for criminal charges in context of prison escape).
Under the common law, "[d]uress was said to excuse criminal conduct where the
actor was under an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury,
which threat caused the actor to engage in conduct violating the literal terms of
the criminal law." See id. (describing historic common law distinction between duress and necessity).
99. See id. at 410 (refraining from speculation as to whether duress is or is not
available defense where law does not specifically provide for it). Justice Blackmun
argued for the existence of an implied defense of duress, at least in the context of
the prison escape case before him. See id. at 424-25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("Congress in so many words has not enacted specific statutory duress or necessity
defenses that would excuse or justify commission of an otherwise unlawful act.
The concept of such a defense, however, is 'anciently woven into the fabric of our
culture.") (citation omitted). Further, though "the Court [in Bailey] declines to
address the issue, it at least implies that it would recognize the common-law defenses of duress and necessity to the federal crime of prison escape .
Id. at
425.
100. See id. at 410-11 (describing standard for showing duress in context of
prison escape); see also Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981)
(holding that duress did not exist under circumstances for former Nazi concentration camp guard, but recognizing that "[o]ther cases may present more difficult
line-drawing problems"); Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 813 (8th Cir. 2001)
("Under Fedorenko, a court faced with difficult 'line-drawing problems' should engage in a particularized evaluation in order to determine whether an individual's
behavior was culpable .... ").
101. See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 411 (applying standard of duress).
102. See id. at 411 n.8 (discussing when duress might exist) (citing to R.I. Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1949)). In
RIL Recreation Center, Inc., the court held that a person acting under threat of death
to his relatives still could be found guilty for committing a crime if that person had
opportunity to contact police beforehand. See R.L Recreation Center, Inc., 117 F.2d
at 605 (holding that person "was free to telephone the police himself' and was not
acting "under the muzzles of the bandits' guns"). According to the court,
"'[c]oercion which will excuse the commission of a criminal act must be immediate and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily injury if the act is not done.'" Id. (providing standard necessary for
showing duress).
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out the country have similarly set the bar extraordinarily high for finding
10 3
duress, and other judges have refused to consider the defense at all.
Following suit, the Department of Homeland Security has also refused resettlement for many refugees who were forced at gunpoint into manual
10 4
labor by terrorist organizations.
The application of such a strict interpretation essentially prohibits refugee assistance to thousands of Iraqis who have paid ransoms to terrorist
kidnappers threatening to kill their loved ones. 10 5 Kidnappings of regular
civilians by various gangs and organizations remain widespread throughout Iraq. 10 6 This provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, while
particularly problematic for Iraqis, affects refugees throughout the
world. 10 7 Exemplifying the overly-broad scope that the provision inadvertently entails, the Department of Homeland Security has conceded that a
literal interpretation of the law bars entry into the United States for the
103. SeeJennie Pasquarella, Blaming Terror's Victims: US. Immigration Law Unfairly Denies Refuge to Those Forced to Help Rebels, LEGAL TIMES, Vol. 29, No. 22, May

29, 2006, at 2, available at https://141.161.16.100/news/documents/LegalTimesArticle5-29-06.pdf (citation omitted) (discussing immigration judge's refusal
to considered involuntariness of refugee's actions and holding that he had provided material support). A Sri Lankan organization, which the court held was a
terrorist organization, had kidnapped the refugee. See id. (describing facts of
case). The group forced the kidnapped refugee to pay 50,000 rupees for his release, which the immigration judge held was material support under the law. See
id. (discussing immigration judge's holding).
104. See id. at 1 (explaining that under new law, Department of Homeland
Security refuses resettlement to refugees who performed laundry services for guerillas at gunpoint and under threat of death).
105. See Anna Husarska, The Price of a Name Is Death, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Mar. 26,
2007, cited in Int'l Refugee Comm., The Price of a Name is Death, Mar. 19, 2007,
available at http://www.theirc.org/news/the-price-of-a-name-is-death.html
(describing how by paying $10,000 to unnamed gunmen for safe return of nineyear-old son and eleven-year-old daughter, one Iraqi father has essentially disqualified himself from any hope of refugee resettlement in United States); see also US
Slams Door on Iraqis who Helped It, TELEGRAPH (London), May 5, 2007, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/05/27/wirql 27.
xml (telling similar story of female Iraqi former translator who worries resettlement in United States is now impossible after her husband paid ransom to armed
men who had kidnapped their sixteen-year-old son).
106. See Nicholas Blanford, Iraq KidnappingsHard to Stop, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 9, 2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0609/p06s02woiq.html (describing growing concern that kidnappers are selling hostages to militant Islamic groups); see also Ilene R. Prusher, Kidnapping in Iraq on the Rise, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 10, 2003, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/
0910/p05s02-woiq.html (describing rising crime, especially kidnapping, that exists
in Baghdad).
107. See Mark Fleming, Emi MacLean & Amanda Taub, Unintended Consequences: Refugee Victims of the War on Terror, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 759, 763-66 (2006)
(reporting on how strict application of new legislation, specifically provision regarding material support for terrorist organizations, has prevented many Columbians that fled guerilla violence in their home country from effectively seeking
asylum or refugee protection in United States).
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Iraqi individual who worked with the United States Marines to rescue kidnapped soldier Jessica Lynch. 108
2.

Material Support Obstacles for Translators

For many individuals who worked as translators for the United States
military, however, the eligibility requirements for special immigrant status
present a significant obstacle. 10 9 Individuals must obtain both proof from
the United States military that they worked as translators and a favorable
letter of recommendation from the General under which they worked.110
This can be a very difficult and time-consuming task for a refugee living in
a UNHCR camp or Syrian slum with little access to phones or internet.'
The 1-360 application form for special immigrants has yet to be updated
1 12
for translators, which could make the process even more confusing.
The processing of the 1-360-which is free for some groups applying as
special immigrants-costs hundreds of dollars for Iraqi translators, many
of whom have spent most of their savings fleeing Iraq.' 13 In addition, the
108. See Pasquarella, supra note 103, at 2 (explaining how under strict interpretation of law, United States Marines would qualify as Tier III terrorist organization because they fought against established Iraqi government).
109. For a discussion of the requirements for special immigrant visas for Iraqi
translators, see infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
110. See Immigrant Visas: Information on Special Immigrant Status for Persons Serving as Translators with the United States Armed Forces, supra note 69 (describing resources available through United States government to former Iraqi or Afghani
interpreters who worked for United States military). For translators who worked
with the United States Navy, a Flag Officer is acceptable. See id. (clarifying requirement for resettlement consideration for former military translators).
111. See Curry, supra note 28 (describing living conditions for Iraqi refugees
in Middle East); Miller, supra note 24 (describing high levels of poverty for Iraqi
refugees); Palmer, supra note 33 (discussing limited resources that many Iraqi refugees, especially females, have in their host countries).
112. See U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, 1-360, Petition for Amerasian,
Widow(er) or Special Immigrant, OMB No. 1615-0020 (2007), available at http://
www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-360.pdf (providing application for special immigrant
visa). There is no mention of Iraqi translators on the form, and Iraqis must describe in the section titled "Other" why they are eligible for the special immigrant
visa. See id. (describing layout of 1-360 Form). The form is also available to (a)
Amerasians, (b) widowers of a United States citizen who died within the past two
years, (c) special immigrant juveniles, (d) special immigrant religious workers, (e)
special immigrant based on employment with the Panama Canal Company, Canal
Zone Government or United States Government in the Canal Zone, (f) special
immigrant physicians, (g) special immigrant international organization employees
or family members, (h) special immigrant armed forces members, (i) self-petitioning spouse of abusive United States citizen or lawful permanent resident or (j) selfpetitioning child of abusive United States citizen or lawful permanent residents.
See id. (listing categories of eligible individuals for special visa).
113. See Immigrant Visas: Information on Special Immigrant Status for Persons Serving as Translatorswith the United States Armed Forces, supra note 69 (noting costs and
requirements of 1-360 application for Iraqi and Afghani translators). Iraqis applying for the special immigrant visa must pay $375 to even be considered. See id.
(imposing application fee for processing 1-360). Amerasians, special immigrant
juveniles and self-petitioning battered or abused spouses, parents or children of
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United States has limited its special visa protection to no more than fifty
14
translators per year.'
3.

Material Support Obstacles with Documentation

Iraqis also face the same basic problems of qualifying for legal protection that almost all refugees throughout the world must face. 11 5 One
would expect that "[f] orced displacement, violence, lack of infrastructure,
illness and lack of stability are not ideal conditions for preserving formal
identity documents such as passports, birth certificates, or marriage certificates." 1 6 Refugees, therefore, face the added challenge of preserving the
documents that prove who they are, saving proof that shows why they are
refugees and proving that they are not involved with terrorism)'17
V.

PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION LAW AND
POLICY PERTAINING TO IRAQI REFUGEES

There is a growing need to reform the United States immigration law
and policy that govern Iraqi refugee resettlement.1 18 The United States
should take a greater role in addressing the Iraqi refugee crisis.119
United States citizens or permanent residents pay no fees for the 1-360. See U.S.
Citizen and Immigration Services, Petitionfor Amerasian, Widow(er) or Special Immigrant, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f6141
76543f6dla/?vgnextoid=95be2cla6855d01OVgnVCM10000048f3d6alRCRD&
vgnextchannel=db029c7755cb901OVgnVCM10000045f3d6alRCRD (setting out application fees for different individuals seeking special immigrant status). While a
translator can request a fee waiver upon submission of the 1-360, if the waiver is
denied, the petition and all supporting documents will be returned and the place
in line will not be retained. See Immigrant Visas: Information on Special Immigrant
Statusfor Persons Serving as Translatorswith the United States Armed Forces, supra note
69 (describing conditions of fee waiver).
114. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-163, § 1059, 119 Stat. 3136, 3443 (limiting special immigrant program to fifty
translators per year); see also MARGESSON, supra note 40, at 14-15 (explaining that
fifty-individual limit excludes spouses and children of translators).
115. See Cianciarulo, supra note 54, at 481 (discussing universal problems confronting refugees throughout world).
116. See id. (describing problems refugees face with preserving relevant
documents).
117. See id. (discussing challenges presented to refugees seeking resettlement
who do not possess sufficient documentation to prove their identity and other relevant characteristics).
118. See S. 1651, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (discussing reasons for United States
government to reform its immigration law and policy). The proposed legislation
warns that "[i]f [the Iraqi refugees'] needs are not quickly and adequately met,
these populations could become a fertile recruiting ground for terrorists." Id.
(urging United States to take action to address growing humanitarian crisis of
Iraqi refugees).
119. See id. (recognizing that while "United States cannot resettle all of Iraq's
refugees in the United States," it still "has a fundamental obligation to help the
vast number of Iraqis displaced in Iraq and throughout the region by the war and
the associated chaos, especially those who have supported America's efforts in
Iraq").
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Though the UNHCR's work and leadership should be praised, it cannot
provide the sole remedy to the ever-growing crisis. 120 The United States
Congress should amend the material support provision so that refugees
21
who paid ransoms under duress are not disqualified from resettlement. 1
The United States government should also modify its existing special immigrant program by enacting a special visa that is more accessible to Iraqis
who formally worked for the United States military or who are members of
vulnerable minorities. 122 Finally, the United States should increase the
number of Iraqi refugees allowed into the United States and expedite
123
their resettlement.

120. See Alice Farmer, Refugee Responses, State-like Behavior, and Accountabilityfor
Human Rights Violations: A Case Study of Sexual Violence in Guinea's Refugee Camps, 9
YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 44, 63-64 (2006) (discussing shortcomings of 1951
Convention Relating to Status of Refugees). The ambiguities in key terms of the
Convention prove especially problematic when the UNHCR attempts to define
how human rights norms apply in massive refugee influxes and other emergency
situations. See id. (describing need for wider and more-defined human rights basis
for refugee law).
121. See "MaterialSupport" Litigation; Contact Human Rights First, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW FOUNDATION LEGAL AcTION CENTER LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE
NEWSLETTER, Vol. 1, No. 17, Sept. 27, 2006, at 1-2, availableat http://www.ailf.org/

lac/litclearinghouse/litclr-newsletter_92706.pdf (describing work of "gathering
examples of asylum seekers affected by this bar to help policy makers understand
that genuine refugees should not improperly be denied asylum under these overly
broad definitions."). The author notes that hundreds of refugees "are being impacted by the government's application of the 'material support' provision of the
terrorist activity ground of inadmissibility." Id. at 1 (describing effects of existing
material support provision).
122. See S.1651, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007) (proposing that certain groups of
Iraqis receive priority status for refugee resettlement). The proposed legislation
extends prioritization to (1) "Iraqis who were employed by, or worked for or directly with the United States Government, in Iraq"; (2) Iraqis who were employed
in Iraq by either "a media or nongovernmental organization based in the United
States" or "an organization or entity that has received a grant from, or entered into
a cooperative agreement or contract with, the United States Government"; (3) the
immediate family members of these individuals; and (4) "Iraqis who are members
of a religious or minority community" and who have close family members in the
United States. See id. (listing groups of Iraqis who are eligible for priority refugee
resettlement). The United States House of Representatives has proposed similar
legislation. See H.R. 3674, 110th Cong. §§ 7-8 (2007) (prioritizing resettlement for
Iraqis who "were employed by the United States Government, United States companies, and nongovernmental organizations" or who "are members of particularly
vulnerable refugee populations, including Iraqis from ethnically mixed families
and Iraqis who are members of religious or other minority groups").
123. See H.R. 3674, 110th Cong. § 8 (2007) (proposing that Secretary of
Homeland Security and Secretary of State work to make refugee resettlement for
Iraqi refugees more efficient, and, additionally, increase annual resettlement
quota to admit up to 20,000 Iraqis annually).
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Amending the Material Support Provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act

The United States should amend the Immigration and Nationality Act
and its material support provision to narrow the overly-broad definition of
a terrorist organization. 12 4 The literal interpretation of the current law
classifies American allies, such as the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, as
terrorist organizations. 12 5 The Department of Homeland Security has
even admitted to the Board of Immigration Appeals that the United States
military is a terrorist organization under a straightforward reading of the
statute.' 2 6 This absurdity demonstrates how dangerously ambiguous the
law is and, further, how it can disadvantage innocent refugees who need
12 7
the United States' legal protection.
The legislature should also amend the material support provision of
the Immigration and Nationality Act to create an exception for support
given under duress. 128 The United States government has waived the application of the material support bar before, and it should do the same for
many groups of Iraqi refugees, especially those who worked for the United
States military.' 29 Though the law does allow for either the Secretary of
124. See U.S. Refugee Admissions and Policy: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55
(2006) (Submission for the Record by Ellen Sauerbrey, Asst. Sec'y for Population,
Refugees and Migration, U.S. Dep't of State), available at http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senatehearings&docid=f:32151 .pdf
(stating that Congress should resolve problems caused by material support and
terrorist organization provisions of Immigration and Nationality Act).
125. See Fleming, supra note 107, at 780-81 (discussing broad description of
terrorist organization in Immigration and Nationality Act that "appl [ies] equally to
organizations that the U.S. government opposes and supports"). Fleming writes
that an Afghani "who provided support to Afghanistan's Northern Alliance in the
1990s would be barred from entry even though the North Alliance was fighting the
Taliban government, a regime the U.S. government considered illegitimate." Id. at
781 (illustrating breadth of definition for terrorist organization under Immigration and Nationality Act).
126. See id. at 781 n.86 (citation omitted) (discussing broad definition of terrorist organization in Immigration and Nationality Act). Under the current definition of terrorist organization in the law, the United States Marines would qualify as
a Tier III organization because "their activity was unlawful during the U.S. occupation of Iraq under Iraqi law and they were fighting against an established government." Id. (explaining how United States military could classify as terrorist
organization).
127. See "MaterialSupport" Litigation; Contact Human Rights First, supra note
121, at 1-2 ("Human Rights First,a[n] ...organization that is coordinating the work
on this issue, reports that many of the cases affected by the 'material support'
provision involve refugees who provided money to 'terrorist organizations' under
duress and refugees who supported pro-democracy groups that fought repressive
regimes.").
128. See id. (discussing efforts "to help policy makers understand that genuine
refugees should not improperly be denied asylum under these overly broad
definitions").
129. See Pasquarella, supra note 103, at 3 (describing last May's decision by
Departments of State, Justice and Homeland Security to waive application of mate-
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State or the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive the material support
provision in limited circumstances, it makes no explicit mention of duress.' 30 Further, the government has granted a waiver on only three occa13 1
sions, none of which included Iraqi refugees.
The Department of State has said that the Immigration and Nationality Act should achieve a better balance between humanitarian commitments and national security concerns. 1 32 A proposed solution to the
problem would refine the duress exception to the material support provision.' 3 3 Under the proposed change to the Immigration and Nationality
rial support bar to some of 9,300 Burmese refugees awaiting resettlement in Thailand who had provided material support to opposition group in Myanmar).
130. See Real I.D. Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 104, 119 Stat. 231, 309 (2005)
(amending Immigration and Nationality Act to create waiver of material support
provision). The amendment allows either the Secretary of State, after consultation
with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General, to waive the material support provision. See id. (granting government officials authority to grant material support waiver). This waiver can be
granted by determining that the provision need not apply to a particular refugee
who has materially supported a terrorist organization, or alternatively, that classification as a Tier III terrorist organization does "not apply to a group solely by virtue
of having a subgroup within the scope of that subsection." See id. (describing application of material support waiver). Though it is possible for it to do so, the government has never granted a waiver in cases where material support was given under
duress. See The Plight of Iraqi Refugees: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, S. Comm. on the judiciary),
available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200701/011607.htm (commenting on
rare application of material support waiver, and that "the waiver authority, although available, has never been used in cases of coercion").
131. See The 'MaterialSupport Bar': Denying Refuge to the Persecuted?: Hearingon
the "MaterialSupport" Bar Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Jennifer Daskal, Senior
Counterterrorism Counsel, Human Rights Watch), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/09/19/usint16941.htm (discussing past use of material support
waiver); The 'Material Support Bar'" Denying Refuge to the Persecuted?: Hearing on the
"MaterialSupport" Bar Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Anwen Hughes, Senior
Counsel, Refugee Protection Program of Human Rights First), available at http://
judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2439&wit_id=6661 (discussing past use of
material support waiver); The Material Support Issue and Its Effects on Vulnerable Refugees, Jesuit Refugee Service USA (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.jrsusa.oactionalert_
material-support.htm (describing minimal use of waiver to material support provision in Immigration and Nationality Act). Neither the Secretary of State nor the
Secretary of Homeland Security granted a waiver during its first two years of existence, and since then, "the waiver has only been granted three times to allow for
the admission of two groups of Burmese refugees in Thailand, and for the admission of groups of Burmese Chin living in precarious situations in Thailand, India
and Malaysia." Id. (listing previous grants of material support waiver).
132. See U.S. Refugee Admissions and Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship of the Comm. on the Judiciary,supra note 124, at
55 (emphasizing that central focus of United States refugee program is "to achieve
a balance between humanitarian commitments and national security concerns").
133. See id. (suggesting that terrorism and material support for it should be
defined better). Assistant Secretary Sauerbrey states that "[tierrorism as com-
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Act's duress exception, refugees must establish that they acted under duress and that they will not threaten national security, but they need not
prove that the kidnappers were not considered members of official terror13 4
ist organizations.
Judges should also interpret the Immigration and Nationality Act accordingly and, as such, avoid overly strict applications-of the material support bar.'3 5 In the past few years, the American court system has
repeatedly checked the federal executive and legislative branches when, in

the name of national security, laws and regulations have undermined the
rights of aliens and subjected them to injustice.' 3 6 Additionally, courts
monly understood includes acts intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion.
Terrorism is not understood to include paying a ransom to obtain the release of a
kidnapped child." Id. (illustrating what should constitute terrorism under Immi-

gration and Nationality Act).
134. See id. at 56 (listing three elements for proposed definition of duress).
Under the proposed definition, the three elements of duress are: (1) "an individual must show that he or she was faced with what a reasonable person would deem
a threat of death or serious bodily harm against him or herself or someone else";
(2) "the individual must show that he or she acted necessarily and reasonably to
avoid this threat" and (3) "even where the applicant has established that he or she
acted under duress, the adjudicator must affirmatively determine that the refugee
or asylum seeker will not threaten the security of United States nationals or the
national security of the United States." Id. (explaining meaning of each of three
elements of duress). The proposal continues, noting that even if a refugee applicant does prove that any material support he or she gave to a terrorist organization
was done under duress, that this person can be denied resettlement on other
grounds. See id. (providing other justifications for denying refugee resettlement in
order to ensure national security). "These include engaging in terrorist activities,
espousing terrorism, inciting terrorism, receiving military training from a designated terrorist organization, [or] ... soliciting others to join a designated terrorist
organization." Id. (listing possible grounds for denial of refugee resettlement).
135. Cf Norman Abrams, The MaterialSupport Terrorism Offenses: PerspectivesDerivedfrom the (Early) Model Penal Code, IJ. NAT'L SEC. L. & PoL'v 5, 31 (2005) (warning that there is danger in "[e]xpansive interpretation of the material support
offenses" as found in Model Penal Code for both federal and state criminal law).
Abrams writes that while "[i] t might be argued that an expansive approach to statutory interpretation . . . can be justified, given the importance of providing law
enforcement with tools adequate to deal with the extremely serious dangers that
terrorism poses," such an interpretation could have a significant impact on society
and on democratic values. See id. (arguing against broad interpretation of material
support laws). Instead, he notes that "[i]f the government finds itself hamstrung
in its anti-terrorism enforcement by judges who give the material support categories a more normal reading," then it can amend the statute to make the intended
meaning of the material support law clearer. See id. (advocating for moderate interpretation of material support law).
136. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480-81 (2004) (holding that United
States court system had authority and jurisdiction to decide whether aliens detained at military prison in Guantanamo Bay were rightfully imprisoned). In
Rasul, the claim was brought by two British nationals and other foreign nationals
captured in Afghanistan. See id. at 470-71 (detailing facts of case). The Supreme
Court has heard other similar challenges. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
537 (2004) (holding that United States citizen detained as enemy combatant at
Guantanamo is entitled to due process absent suspension of writ of habeas corpus
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have long-upheld the practice of interpreting statutes in ways that prevent
absurd results. 13 7 Penalizing victims of terrorism would surely be an unintended consequence of an act legislated to combat terrorism, and there138
fore, judges should prevent these outcomes.
Further, a judge's failure to recognize an inherent duress exception
to the material support bar in asylum proceedings could violate international legal conventions to which the United States is a member. 139 If
expelling refugees would subject them to persecution based on their race,
religion or membership in a certain social or political group-as is the
reality for many Iraqis refugees-the United States cannot legally expel
these individuals unless they pose a threat to national security. 140 If a refugee's only association with terrorism was material support involuntarily
given under duress, especially for those whose support came in the form
of ransoms for family members kidnapped by terrorist groups, there are
by Congress). In Hamdi, the Afghan Northern Alliance had captured an individual, who held joint United States and Saudi Arabian citizenship, fighting against
the United States military alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. See id. at 510 (detailing facts of case). A recent case also demonstrated-the Supreme Court's willingness to restrain government actions that undermine international law. See
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2759-60 (2006) ("[T]he military commission
convened to try Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the [Uniform Code of Military Justice] and the Geneva Conventions."). In Hamdan, a Yemeni citizen captured in Afghanistan and imprisoned at
Guantanamo Bay, was charged with conspiracy to commit terrorism for acting as
Osama bin Laden's driver in Afghanistan. See id. at 2760-61 (detailing facts of
case). Four Justices also held that the law of war prohibits military commissions
from trying the offense with which Hamdan was charged. See id. at 2759-60 (rejecting military commissions' assertion of authority to hear case).
137. See United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted) (stating that avoiding "unintended or absurd results" is "deeply rooted
rule of statutory construction").
138. See 151 CONG. REc. H454 (2005) (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on Judiciary) ("The Real ID Act will reduce the
opportunity for immigration fraud so that we can protect honest asylum seekers and
stop rewarding the terrorists and criminals who falsely claim persecution.") (emphasis added).
139. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 52, art. I
(adopting relevant provisions of 1951 Convention Relating to Status of Refugees).
Under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, the United States cannot expel a refugee
seeking asylum back to face persecution in his or her former country unless "there
are reasonable grounds for regarding [the refugee] as a danger to the... country
in which he is." Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supranote 52, art.
33 (describing scenario where refugee may be legally expelled from country).
140. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 52, art. I (incorporating relevant provisions of 1951 Convention Relating to Status of Refugees). Under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, "[n]o Contracting States shall
expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 52, art. 33 (prohibiting
signatory states from engaging in refugee refoulment).
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no grounds for considering that individual a threat to the United States'
14 1
national security.
While judges should make an effort to rule sensibly, amending the
Immigration and Nationality Act remains the most effective means of addressing this problem. 142 The judiciary is bound by legal precedent that
1 43
The
promotes a strict interpretation of the material support provision.'
express language classifies any monetary contribution as material support,
and so long as the statutory language remains the same, ransom payments
144
likely will continue to disqualify many refugees for resettlement.
B.

Special Status Visas for Iraqi Refugees

The United States government should create a priority status in a special visa for the most vulnerable Iraqi refugees and minority populations. 14 5 In the past, the United States government has effectively
responded to religious persecution of minorities throughout the world
through special refugee resettlement. 146 For example, the United States
141. See Pasquarella, supra note 103, at 2-3 (arguing that material support bar
violates international law when applied to refugees who gave support under
duress).
142. See U.S. Refugee Admissions and Policy: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Immigration,Border Security and Citizenship of the Comm. on the Judiciary,supra note 124, at
55 (stating that "[t]he time has come" for Congress to "resolve the outstanding
areas of disagreement" concerning material support and terrorist organization
provisions of Immigration and Nationality Act).
143. See, e.g., Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir.
2002) ("Congress' goal of cutting off funding for terrorism would be seriously
compromised if terrorist organizations could avoid liability by simply pooling together small donations to fund a terrorist act."); Humanitarian Law Project v.
Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) ("[O]rganizations
that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any
contributionto such an organization facilities that conduct.") (emphasis added); see
also Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 299 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that provision of food and setting up tents constituted material support for terrorism).
144. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (iv) (VI)
(2006) (stating that material support exists when one provides "funds, transfer of
funds, or other material financial benefit ...to a terrorist organization").
145. See S.1651, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007) (proposing that certain groups of
vulnerable Iraqis receive priority consideration for refugee resettlement); see also
Kirk W. Johnson, Op-Ed., Hounded by Insurgents, Abandoned by Us, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/opinion/18johnson.
html?_-r=l&oref=slogin (quoting Sen. Jon Kyl). Sen. Kyl stated that "'[i]f we would
have people in Iraq, or elsewhere in the world, trust us and work with us, then we
need to take care that the United States maintains a reputation for trustworthiness
and for taking care of its friends."' Id. (urging United States to help its supporters
and allies in Iraq). He continued, saying that "'[t]he world will be watching and
judging how America treats people who are seen to be on our side"' and that the
United States "cannot afford to foster a perception of unfairness that will make it
more difficult for the United States to recruit supporters in the future."' Id. (discussing potential stakes of United States government's policy decisions in Iraq).
146. See Act of Nov. 21, 1989 (Lautenberg Amendment), Pub. L. No. 101-167,
§ 599(D), 103 Stat. 1195, 1261-1263 (approving special cultural preferences for
resettling refugees of certain religious groups). Specifically, the Lautenberg
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Congress created a presumption of refugee status for persecuted Christian
and SovietJewish refugees seeking resettlement during the 1990s.' 4 7 Congress should duplicate these efforts with the current refugee crisis in Iraq
and create a presumption of refugee status for Iraqi Christians, such as
members of the Chaldean Church who consistently suffer violent attacks
148
by extremist groups within the country.
The United States also provided special immigrant visas in the past
for individuals targeted for their affiliation with the United States military,
and this program's success should guide current efforts to help Iraqi translators needing resettlement in the United States. 149 The Amerasian Visa
was specifically designed to help families in South East Asia who suffered
harassment and discrimination because of their affiliation with American
military troops in the region during the 1960s and 1970s. 150 A humanitarian crisis developed in South East Asia for children of Asian mothers who
conceived with a United States serviceman. 15 1 These children, often referred to as bui doi or dust children, largely were born in Vietnam during
Amendment identified Soviet Jews, Soviet Evangelical Christians and active members of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as
special religious minorities. See id. (authorizing special consideration to certain
religious minorities). Also, fifty-four United States Senators in 1989 wrote to then
Secretary of State James Baker and Attorney General Richard Thornburgh calling
"on the administration to return to the policy of regarding all Soviet Jews as refugees, noting the history of anti-Semitism in Russia and the Soviet Union." Victor
Rosenberg, Refugee Statusfor Soviet Jewish Immigrants to the United States, 19 TouRo L.
REv. 419, 432 (2003) (citation omitted) (illustrating past examples of congressional efforts encouraging administration to expedite refugee resettlement). Congress continues to renew the Lautenberg Amendment every year. SeeWaibsnaider,
supra note 26, at 402 (describing continued congressional precedent for giving
special protection to religious minority refugees); see also Barry Sautman, The Meaning of "Well-Founded Fear of Persecution" in United States Asylum Law and in International Law, 9 FoimiHm INT'L L.J. 483, 483-84 (1985) (discussing how United States
government has formally favored and assisted Jewish refugees from the Soviet
Union, as well as Cubans and Indochinese).
147. See Rosenberg, supra note 146, at 433 (discussing presumption of refugee
status that Congress granted to certain Christians and Jews from specified countries). The presumption of refugee status meant that the Immigration and Naturalization Service would presume the individual to be a refugee unless there is
contrary evidence, though they would still undergo personal interviews and be subject to annual ceilings on admissions of refugees. See id. (discussing meaning of
presumption of refugee status).
148. See Iraq's Christian Minority Flees Violence, supra note 39 (discussing violent
targeting of Christian minority in Iraq).
149. See Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to Provide Preferential Treatment in the Admission of Certain Children of United States Armed
Forces Personnel, Pub. L. No. 97-359, 96 Stat. 1716,1716 (1982) (granting special
consideration to Amerasian children seeking visas to resettle in United States); see
also S.1651, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007) (proposing that Iraqis who have worked for
the United States, as well as their families, receive priority for resettlement).
150. See Cianciarulo, supra note 54, at 485 n.149 (noting that Amerasian Visa
focused on families from Cambodia, Korea, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam).
151. See id. at 485-86 (describing historical context that gave rise to Amerasian
Visa).
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the 1960s and 1970s. 152 When the United States withdrew from Asia and
communist regimes took power in most countries in the region, the new
governments, and society in53general, began targeting these Amerasian
children and their families.'
The United States Congress responded to the crisis by creating a special, non-refugee immigrant visa for Amerasian children to come to the
United States and gain permanent residency. 154 The law, which Congress
passed in 1982, amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide
preferential treatment to these children by granting them admission into
the United States. 155 The Amerasian Homecoming Act of 1987 granted
the same preferential treatment to the mothers and specified family members of the children.' 56 Since the inception of this legislation, approximately 23,000 Amerasians and 67,000 of their relatives have immigrated to
the United States on an Amerasian Visa, totaling 90,000 visa issuances in
all. 15 7 Though some Iraqi translators are currently eligible for a special
status visa, the government could develop a more effective program that is
specially designed for translators, does not cost hundreds of dollars to ap152. See id. (reporting on oppression and ostracism suffered by Amerasian
children and their families in communities throughout Vietnam and other parts of
Southeast Asia); KayJohnson, Children of the Dust, TIME, May 13, 2002, http://www.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,237115,00.html?iid=chix-sphere (reporting on poor treatment of Amerasian children and their families in communities
throughout Vietnam); Cianciarulo, supra note 54, at 485-86 (reporting on oppression and ostracism suffered by Amerasian children and their families in communities throughout Vietnam and other parts of Southeast Asia). Some estimates put
the number of children born to United States soldiers and other employees or
contractors in Vietnam as high as 50,000. See Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, The Children
They Left Behind, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 26, 2003, http://www.boston.com/news/
(reportglobe/magazine/articles/2003/10/26/thechildrenjthey_leftbehind/
ing on recent efforts of United States military veterans who served in Southeast
Asia to locate their children and their children's mothers).
153. See Cianciarulo, supra note 54, at 485-86 ("After the withdrawal of U.S.
troops and the rise of the communist government in Vietnam, children of U.S.
servicemen, and often the children's mothers, became the targets of brutality
. . . . 11).

154. See Op-Ed., Bring the Dust Children Home, N.Y. TiMES,July 12, 1982, at A14,
71
available at http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30610F73D5DOC
8DDDAE0894DA484D81 &n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/I/Immigration%20and%20Refugees (explaining that term "non-refugee" was political
choice used to avoid damaging United States-Vietnamese relations by portraying
Vietnamese government as persecutor of group of its own citizens).
155. See Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to Provide Preferential Treatment in the Admission of Certain Children of United States Citizens,
Pub. L. No. 97-359, 96 Stat. 1716, 1716 (1982) (granting special consideration to
Amerasian children seeking visas to resettle in United States).
156. See Amerasian Homecoming Act Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1988, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 584,
101 Stat. 1329-183 (1987) (extending special consideration not just to Amerasian
children, but also to their immediate family).
157. See Johnson, supra note 152 (reporting on number of Amerasians and
their family members resettled in United States under Amerasian Visa).
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ply and does not place a cap on yearly candidates. 158 The success of the
Amerasian program demonstrates its applicability to other humanitarian
crises where victims are targeted, in part, due to their past affiliation with
59
American military personnel.
C.

Increase and Expedite Resettlement of Iraqi Refugees in the United States

The United States should increase the number of refugees that it
resettles each year. 160 Syria andJordan cannot absorb the entirety of Iraqi
refugees on their own. 16 1 For practical reasons, burden sharing and mutual accountability should exist among the international community to
cope with the growing number of refugees. 162 Additionally, the United
States should expedite the current processing program it has established
1 63
in the region for refugee resettlement.
158. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-163, § 1059, 119 Stat. 3136, 3443 (setting forth provision for resettling former
Iraqi and Afghani interpreters). For a discussion of the shortcomings of the current immigration law for these interpreters, see supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
159. See Husarska, Refugee Scandal, supra note 38 (describing violent targeting
of Iraqi interpreters for their past affiliation with United States military); Johnson,
supra note 38 (reporting on similar violence against Iraqi interpreters employed by
American government).
160. See Iraqi Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement, and Security Act of 2007, H.R. 3674, 110th Cong. § 8(c) (proposing that up to 20,000 Iraqis can be accepted into United States as refugees
during each of fiscal years 2008, 2009 and 2010).
161. See Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, S.1651, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) ("Iraq
refugees are a significant financial burden on countries in the region. The Iraq
Study Group concluded that if the refugee crisis 'is not addressed, Iraq and the
region could be further destabilized."'); H.R. 3674 § 82(10c) ("The massive flow of
Iraqi refugees into neighboring host countries has overwhelmed existing social,
economic, and security capacities of such countries.").
162. See Farmer, supra note 120, at 82 (discussing need for UNHCR, non-governmental organizations and other international actors to share accountability).
Farmer writes that "[i]nternational actors must recognize that the realization of
human rights of refugees cannot be the sole responsibility of host states, and that a
multi-layered accountability system is desperately needed." Id. (calling for increased international accountability). There is an important need for nations to
share the burden of the current refugee crisis. See Steinbock, supra note 62, at 985
(describing three basic reasons for international burden sharing with refugee resettlement). Burden sharing is optimal because (1) "refugees do not move evenly
around the globe, both because refugee-producing events are concentrated in particular countries or regions, and because most refugees cannot seek sanctuary far
from their countries of origin[,]" (2) "despite the benefits individual refugees
might ultimately bring, refugee-receiving countries regard refugees as an unwanted burden in just about every way imaginable" and (3) "countries vary widely
in their abilities to cope with refugees in their territory." See id. (providing reasons
why United States immigration law should reflect burden sharing obligations regarding refugee resettlement).
163. See H.R. 3674 § 8(a) (proposing that refugee resettlement for Iraqi refugees be made more efficient). "[T] he Secretary of Homeland Security, in cooperation with the Secretary of State, shall make every effort to streamline the screening
and security investigations processes for assessing the eligibility of Iraqi applicants
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The persistence of undue political influence that limits refugee resettlement of Iraqis in the United States should cease. 1 64 Political considerations continue to infuse bias into the United States refugee resettlement
program, a problem that has historically plagued refugee resettlement legislation in the United States. 165 The government's refusal to increase refugee resettlement for Iraqis stems, in part, from its continuing reluctance to
face certain political ramifications. 16 6 In other scenarios where the
United States played a role in creating vulnerable groups of refugees
through military incursions into foreign countries, the government refused to resettle significant numbers of refugees in the areas under its
military control until after its withdrawal. 167 The United States government has recognized the need to increase refugee resettlement, and it
should not reject thousands of refugees for the sake of saving face and
attempting to portray stability in Iraq.168 Instead, as it did during the violent conflict in Kosovo during the 1990s, the government should promptly
for refugee status in the United States." Id. (urging administration to expedite
resettlement of Iraqi refugees).
164. For a discussion of the history of political influence on immigration law
and policy in the United States, see infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
165. See Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, 1009
(amended by Pub. L. No. 83-751, 68 Stat. 1044 (1950)) (granting visas for refugee
resettlement to United States only to those refugees who showed that they entered
Allied zones in Germany, Austria or Italy before December 23, 1945); see also
Kathryn M. Bockley, A Historical Overview of Refugee Legislation: The Deception of Foreign Policy in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C.J. INrr'L L. & COM. REG. 253, 261-63 (1995)
(explaining how cut-off date prohibited resettlement of 90% of Jewish refugees,
who had entered Allied zones afterwards). "Some members of Congress justified
the restrictions based on the fear that a more 'generous treatment' ofJewish refugees would negatively impact the American economy and social structure." Waibsnaider, supra note 26, at 392, 395 (discussing how politics influenced post-World
War II refugee resettlement legislation).
166. See Bockley, supra note 165, at 271 (describing how during height of
Cold War, only 2,000 of 1.5 million refugees admitted to United States came from
non-communist countries). During this time, the United States ignored refugees
who fled governments supported by the United States and disproportionately admitted refugees from countries whose governments the United States opposed. See
id. (describing pattern of refugee resettlement that emerged in United States government during Cold War); Sautman, supra note 146, at 184-86 (discussing how
United States has usually held emigrants from non-Communist countries to higher
standard of proof than those refugees from Communist countries in showing that
they are refugees and not economic migrants).
167. See Bockley, supra note 165, at 276 ("Many Americans felt a sense of obligation to a people that the United States had supported [in Southeast Asia] and
then abandoned."); Waibsnaider, supranote 26, at 403 (discussing resettlement of
Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian refugees in United States following country's
military disengagement in Southeast Asia).
168. See Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, S.1651, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (setting
out how United States has recognized need to increase refugee resettlement of
Iraqis). The proposed legislation finds that "[i]n April 2007, Assistant Secretary of
State Ellen Sauerbrey said the United States 'could resettle up to 25,000 Iraqi refugees' this year." Id. (finding that United States government has capacity to substantially increase refugee resettlement).
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identify and resettle the most vulnerable refugees placed in crises partly
16 9
because of United States actions abroad.
The United States should do more to expedite the existing resettlement plans for Iraqi refugees. 170 Important national security concerns
and corresponding heightened security screenings come at a cost, and as
such, some harmless refugees likely will be denied resettlement in the
United States. 171 But for thousands of Iraqi refugees that raise no security
concerns, the problem is not with the security requirements themselves,
but rather, the lack of personnel and resources allocated for processing
the refugees. 172 Indeed, the Department of State has announced that
with proper funding from the federal government, the United States
could resettle 20,000 Iraqi refugees by the end of 2007 alone. 173 Congress
placed heavy pressure on the government to remedy delays in previous
decades when government agencies failed to effectively expedite refugee
174
resettlement, and it should do the same now.
169. See Steinbock, supra note 62, at 987 (discussing how after bombings by
United States military in Kosovo that set off regional conflict, United States government felt obligated to reduce suffering "among a population for which it felt some
special responsibility"). The United States ultimately resettled over 14,000 refugees from Kosovo. See id. (describing refugee resettlement during Kosovo
conflict).
170. See Iraqi Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement, and Security Act of 2007, H.R. 3674, 110th Cong. § 2 ("Current United States policies governing the processing of refugees constrain the

Department of Homeland Security from expediting the screening procedures and
increasing the number of Iraqi refugees accepted into the United States.").
171. See Remarks to S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on Iraqi Refugees, 110th Cong.
(2007) (statement of Ellen Sauerbrey, Asst. Sec'y for Population, Refugees and
Migration, U.S. Dep't of State), available at http://www.state.gov/g/prm/rls/
82085.htm (stating that one reason that "so few Iraqis ... have come into the
United States since 2003 is because of an enhanced security review that has been
required that has made it very difficult for these Iraqi refugees who have been
referred to us by UNHCR to pass through the screening mechanism.").
172. See Randall Fenlon, Current Development, International:Creation of a New
Iraq Refugee Task Force, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 333, 334 (2007) (discussing most pressing tasks for newly-created task force in United States Department of State). Fenlon writes that "[m]ost significantly, the task force has been instrumental in
developing a plan to accelerate the resettlement of about 7,000 Iraqis to be referred by the UNHCR within the next nine months." Id. (describing work of task
force).
173. See id. (quoting assertion of Assistant Secretary of State Ellen Sauerbrey
that if given more resources, Department of State could resettle more refugees);
see also Rachel L. Swarns, SenatorsDenounce Bush Policy Limiting Refuge for Iraqis,N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/17/washington/17refugees.html (reporting on political condemnation of inefficient refugee resettlement
by United States).
174. See Rosenberg, supra note 146, at 433 (describing efforts of Congress to
influence specific immigration policy of Department of State) (citing to 135 CONG.
REc. 3, 155 (1989)). A contingent of fifty-four United States Senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State James Baker and Attorney General Richard Thornburgh to
express their concern over year-long delays with processing refugee applications
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Security Concerns

The proposed reforms to immigration law and policy towards Iraqi
175
refugees do not undermine the national security of the United States.
Applicants applying through the UNHCR must overcome several security
safeguards before their claims are ever referred to the United States government. 176 Upon receiving an application from the UNHCR, the United
States runs the applicant's information through several databases to detect
possible security concerns. 177 Further, all cases are referred to the FBI
and the CIA for their own security reviews. 178 Compared to other means
of entrance to the United States, refugee resettlement has historically
been relatively secure. 17 9 In fact, security checks are so thorough that they
for SovietJews in Moscow and the denial of refugee status to a group of SovietJews
temporarily in Rome. See id. at 132 (discussing content of Senators' letter).
175. Cf Crocker Urges Iraq Refugee Action, supranote 85 (suggesting that United
States government can solve problems in current refugee resettlement by allocating more resources and personnel to resettlement program). Ambassador
Crocker notes that the Department of Homeland Security has only a handful of
officers in Jordan to conduct security reviews of Iraqi refugees. See id. (discussing
how lack of personnel, not extent of security checks themselves, force applicants to
wait eight to ten months after being referred to United States by UNHCR before
further processing commences). For a discussion of security concerns raised by
the proposed reforms, see infra notes 176-88 and accompanying text.
176. See Iraqi Refugees: Resettlement Questions and Answers, supra note 83 (detailing UNCHR security checks for applicants seeking resettlement). These checks
entail verifying that the applicant has not committed acts against humanity or war
crimes, and also, may entail up to six investigative interviews. See id. ("UNHCR
staff is trained to identify a range of exclusions 'triggers,' which lead to a more
rigorous examination and possible disqualification from resettlement.").
177. See id. (detailing mandatory screening of all Iraqi refugees). The required security checks include checking an applicant's fingerprints and photograph against multiple databases, and reviewing the files of all the applicant's
relatives already living in the United States in order to confirm the applicant's
credibility. See id. (listing various security screenings refugee applicants must
undergo).
178. See id. (discussing enhanced threshold Iraqi refugees must overcome to
pass Security Advisory Opinions of FBI and CIA). Once an Iraqi applicant makes it
through all security checks, the individual's case will return to the Department of
State for a final review and ultimate decision regarding resettlement. See id.
(describing final stages of security checks for refugee resettlement in United
States).

179. See Cianciarulo, supra note 54, at 461 (2005) (discussing how special immigrant visa for women and children refugees can also be implemented without
undermining national security). None of the September 11, 2001 terrorists were
refugees or applicants for refugee status. See id. at 482 (noting that United States
"continued its expedited processing of non-immigrant visas in Saudi Arabia ...
despite the fact that thirteen of the eighteen hijackers from Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates had received their visas through expedited processing"); see
also THOMAS R.

ELDRIDGE ET AL., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE

UNITED STATES, 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL 116 (2004), available at http://www.9-

(discussing
11commission.gov/staff statements/911_TerrTravMonograph.pdf
dangers of expedited non-immigrant visas, especially those not requiring preliminary interviews with government official). The report finds that "[Department of]
State officials did approve incomplete visa applications and did expedite the issu-
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are in-part blamed for the government's inability to efficiently resettle
thousands of Iraqi refugees.18 0
The United States government can expedite Iraqi refugee resettlement without raising significant security concerns.1 8 1 Instead of cutting
security checks, the United States government should dedicate more resources to processing refugees abroad. 18 2 In the immediate future, the
United States should fast-track security checks, significantly increase the
number of officers in Jordan, raise pressure on the Syrian government to
issue visas to Department of Homeland Security officials and arrange interviews with officials from Washington by video link. 183 Some progress
has been made on these fronts, but more should be done.' 8 4 The comprehensive security screenings for refugees that have been in place for the
past decade have worked efficiently.' 8 5 Relevantly, no terrorists or suspected terrorists have ever entered into the United States through its refugee resettlement program.' 8 6 In addition, the United States can better
utilize provisions within the 1967 Protocol relating to refugees that already
allow for refusal of resettlement for certain security reasons, rather than
ance of visas, requiring few interviews...
screening for expedited visas).

Id. (discussing relatively lax security

180. See Remarks to S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on Iraqi Refugees, supra note 171
(explaining how numerous security checks for each individual applicant prevent
quick resettlement for many refugees).
181. Cf Crocker Urges Iraq Refugee Action, supranote 85 (suggesting ways United
States government can act to make refugee resettlement more efficient).
182. See Iraqi Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement, and Security Act of 2007, H.R. 3674, 110th Cong. § 8(b) (2)
(proposing that Secretary of Homeland Security "increase by 100 percent the number of personnel of Department of Homeland Security who conduct security reviews of Iraqi applicants for refugee status in the United States"); Refugee Crisis in
Iraq Act, S. 1651, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2007) (proposing that Secretary of State
establish refugee processing facilities in Iraqi and in countries in region).
183. See Crocker Urges Iraq Refugee Action, supranote 85 (reporting on Ambassador Crocker's suggestions for processing backlog of refugees referred for resettlement through UNHCR). Other government officials have blamed delays on the
Department of State and the Overseas Processing Entities Agency, which performs
initial screenings and medical examinations of applicants. See id. (recounting debate over how best to improve pace of refugee processing).
184. See Remarks to S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on Iraqi Refugees, supra note 171
(describing new system that aims to expedite processing of certain Iraqi refugees
pre-chosen to leave Iraq). The system, developed in conjunction with the UNHCR,
provides the UNHCR with information for people who the United States government has already chosen for resettlement but who are still relocating in surrounding countries "so that we can alert them to immediately process." See id.
(describing workings of expedited system, but also, providing only one example of
its effective implementation).
185. SeeWaibsnaider, supranote 26, at 422 (noting that none of September 11
hijackers were refugees or were seeking refugee status in United States).
186. See id. (stating that no known terrorist activity has resulted from refugee
admissions).
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18 7
promulgating new and increasingly burdensome legislative regimes.
National security is certainly important, but needless security checks in
excess of the sufficient screening already in existence only further delays
18 8
the already-inadequate refugee resettlement program.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The growing humanitarian crisis affecting millions of Iraqi refugees
requires the increased attention of the United States, whose actions to
date have been ineffective. 18 9 Over four million Iraqis have fled their
homes to escape increasing violence in Iraq, and living conditions for refugees remain poor.1 90 Former translators for the United States military
and members of vulnerable minorities are particularly in need of resettlement.19 1 The current legal protection offered by the United States,
though well-intended, is inadequate and excludes thousands of worthy ref19 2
ugees from resettlement in the United States.
The United States government should reform its existing immigration
law and policy in order to make resettlement of Iraqi refugees more effective. 19 3 The United States government should amend the material support provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act so that it no longer
187. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 52, art. 33
(providing exception to prohibition of refoulement for security reasons). The
Convention states:
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to
the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted
by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to
the community of that country.
Id. (detailing grounds for expelling refugees); see also Gilbert, supra note 57, at 1
("That the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 and its 1967 Protocol might have already made provision for applicants for refugee status who have
committed serious international crimes, such that, if properly applied, they are
denied the protection of the Convention, was also ignored.").
188. See Remarks to Senate Judiciary Committee: Hearing on Iraqi Refugees, supra
note 171 (explaining how numerous security checks delay refugee resettlement
process for many applicants).
189. See Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, S. 1651, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (stating
need for increased help by United States in addressing needs of Iraqi refugees).
190. See id. (finding that 2 million Iraqi refugees have significant humanitarian needs that countries are not meeting); Iraqi Refugee and Internally Displaced
Persons Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement, and Security Act of 2007, H.R.
3674, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (finding that millions of displaced Iraqis are living in
"[i]ncreasing destitution and poverty").
191. See Husarska, Refugee Scandal, supra note 38 (discussing targeting of for-

mer translators who worked for United States military); Iraq's Christian Minority
Flees Violence, supra note 39 (discussing targeting of Christians and other minorities
in Iraq).
192. See Raghavan, supra note 46 (discussing how United States refugee resettlement program has been slow and inefficient thus far).
193. See H.R. 3674 § 3 (asserting "United States must demonstrate its commit-

ment to resettle Iraqi refugees"). The proposed legislation also notes that Iraqi
refugees will continue to have a high impact on regional security, and their well-
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prevents thousands of refugees from resettlement for actions carried out
under duress. 19 4 The judiciary, while respecting Congress's desire to provide a broad definition for terrorist organizations, should apply the law in
a sensible manner that does not produce unintended and unjust results
for refugee resettlement.1 9 5 The United States government should also
redesign its special immigrant visa to give official resettlement prioritization to Iraqis who formally worked for the United States military or who
are members of vulnerable minorities. 196 Additionally, the United States
should increase the number of Iraqi refugees allowed into the country and
expedite their resettlement. 197 Taken together, these proposed reforms
will allow the United States to expeditiously process the most vulnerable
Iraqis for resettlement, maintain stringent security procedures for screening refugees and improve the ever worsening crisis affecting millions of
198
Iraqis.
Kevin Walsh

being must be considered within overall United States policy in Iraq. See id. (stating "sense of Congress" in making its proposal).
194. See "Material Support" Litigation; Contact Human Rights First, supra note
121, at 1 (discussing how material support provision has prevented hundreds of
individuals from receiving legal protection from United States).
195. See United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that
judges have historically made rulings to prevent unintended or absurd results).
196. See Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, S.1651, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007) (proposing that certain groups of Iraqis, including those who worked for United States
military and members of certain minorities, receive priority resettlement in United
States); H.R. 3674 § 7 (proposing similar legislation).
197. See H.R. 3674 § 8 (proposing that Secretary of Homeland Security and
Secretary of State work to make refugee resettlement for Iraqi refugees more efficient, and additionally, to increase annual resettlement allowance up to 20,000
Iraqis annually).
198. See 153 CONG. REc. H7079 (daily ed. June 26, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Blumenauer) (discussing potential effectiveness of proposed reform to immigration law and resettlement policy). Changes proposed in H.R. 2265 would "allow
for more Iraqis to be granted refugee status in the United States." See id. (urging
House to adopt Resolution). Implementing these proposals will allow for more
resettlement, and in some part, alleviate the refugee crisis. Crocker Urges Iraq Refugee Action, supra note 85 (proposing changes to United States refugee resettlement
program to allow for safe but more efficient resettlement).
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